| 地方政府竞争与土地财政策略选择 |
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| 引用本文： | 唐鹏,石晓平,曲福田.地方政府竞争与土地财政策略选择[J].资源科学,2014,36(4):702-711. |
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| 作者姓名： | 唐鹏 石晓平 曲福田 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京农业大学公共管理学院, 南京210095;南京农业大学公共管理学院, 南京210095;南京农业大学公共管理学院, 南京210095 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金重大招标项目（编号：09&ZD046）；教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目（编号：13JZD014；11JZD031）；北京大学-林肯研究院城市发展与土地政策研究中心论文奖学金资助项目；江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目（编号：CXZZ12_0307）。 |
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| 摘 要： | 中国式分权制度对地方政府竞争行为具有重要的影响,地方政府关于财政资源和资本要素的争夺,促使其实施土地出让策略和土地引资策略,以获取与土地有关的收入。本文基于地方政府竞争视角,构建了地方政府土地财政策略选择的理论框架,分析认为不同的土地财政策略面临不同的激励机制,而且由于地方政府竞争策略的互动行为,可能会导致地方政府之间的土地财政策略呈现空间模仿效应或者替代效应。本文选取1999-2007年31个省级地区的面板数据,应用空间计量模型,分别考察了地方政府的土地出让策略和土地引资策略面临的主要激励及其空间效应,结果表明:地方政府面临的财政收支约束是其实施土地出让策略的主要激励,而地方政府之间的资本竞争是地方政府实施土地引资策略的主要激励。地方政府在实施土地出让策略中的模仿效应表现为土地出让面积竞争,土地引资策略的模仿效应表现为对大规模资本的追逐。同时,土地引资策略的替代效应主要表现为地方政府对低价出让土地频率的替代。
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| 关 键 词： | 地方政府竞争 土地财政 策略选择 空间效应 |
| 修稿时间： | 1/6/2014 12:00:00 AM |
Local Government Competition and Land Financial Strategies |
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| TANG Peng,SHI Xiaoping and QU Futian.Local Government Competition and Land Financial Strategies[J].Resources Science,2014,36(4):702-711. |
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| Authors: | TANG Peng SHI Xiaoping and QU Futian |
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| Institution: | College of Public Administration, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, China;College of Public Administration, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, China;College of Public Administration, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, China |
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| Abstract: | The system of Chinese-style decentralization has had an important impact on the competitive behavior of local government. On the one hand,tax sharing reform increased the fiscal pressure on revenue and expenditure of local governments and prompted fiscal competition. On the other hand,the political centralization system induced economic growth competition for local governments. The low-cost supply of land in exchange for capital has occurred frequently and local government competition results in a land granting strategy and land investment introduction strategy to increase extra-budgetary revenue and generate long-term tax income. From the perspective of local government competition,we constructed a theoretical framework for local government land financial strategies. Considered that land financial strategies may have a spatial imitation effect or spatial substitution effect as a spillover influence of local government competitive strategy,we then applied a spatial econometric model based on provincial-level panel data from 1999 to 2007. The results showed that the fiscal restraint of revenue and expenditure is a major incentive for the land granting strategy;government capital competition is the main incentive of the land investment introduction strategy. The spatial imitation effect of the land granting strategy is reflected in the area of land,and the spatial imitation effect of the land investment introduction strategy is reflected in the chase for large-scale capital. At the same time,the spatial substitution effect of the land investment introduction strategy is reflected in the frequency of low-prices granted by the local government. |
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| Keywords: | local government competition land finance strategies choice spatial effect |
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