| 合作创新下考虑双边道德风险的研发外包合同 |
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| 引用本文： | 但斌,宋寒,张旭梅.合作创新下考虑双边道德风险的研发外包合同[J].研究与发展管理,2010,22(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 但斌 宋寒 张旭梅 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，重庆市软科学研究计划项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对外包研发项目合作创新中的双边道德风险问题,运用委托代理理论设计了双边道德风险下的研发外包合同,并对合同参数的影响因素进行了分析.研究结果表明,最优收入共享激励系数与发包方投入的知识技术产出弹性系数负相关,与接包方投入的知识技术产出弹性系数正相关,而与研发项目的产出系数及双方的成本系数无关;最优固定支付与双方的成本系数正相关,与研发项目的产出系数负相关.
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| 关 键 词： | 合作创新 研发外包 双边道德风险 合同设计 |
R&D Outsourcing Contracts Considering Double Moral Hazards in Cooperative Innovation |
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| DAN Bin,SONG Han,ZHANG Xu-mei.R&D Outsourcing Contracts Considering Double Moral Hazards in Cooperative Innovation[J].R&d Management,2010,22(2). |
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| Authors: | DAN Bin SONG Han ZHANG Xu-mei |
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| Abstract: | Aiming at solving the problem of double moral hazards in cooperative innovation of R&D outsourcing, it de-signed R&D outsourcing contract in terms of principal-agent theory, and analyzed the factors on contract parameters. The results indicated that the optimal proportion of revenue-sharing was negatively related with output elastic coefficient of principals' resources, and positively related with output elastic coefficient of agents' resources, and independent of technical coefficient of project and cost coefficients of both participants; the optimal fixed service payment was positively related with cost coefficients of both participants, and negatively related with technical coefficient of project. |
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| Keywords: | cooperative innovation R&D outsourcing double moral hazards contract design |
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