| 风险投资激励机制之研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 唐翰岫,李湛.风险投资激励机制之研究[J].预测,2001,20(1):50-53,34. |
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| 作者姓名： | 唐翰岫 李湛 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,管理学院,上海,200030 |
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| 摘 要： | 激励机制一直是风险投资研究的热点之一，并且提出了很多定性的研究结果。然而，相关的定量研究却几乎没有。本文首先定量分析了当前美国风险企业的激励机制，给出了风险企业家的最优努力水平，并指出了这种激励机制的不足。针对这种不足，本文提出了一种全新的激励机制。对比分析的结果表明，当前美国的风险投资激励机制并不是最优的方式，本文提出的激励机制可以对风险企业家更好地激励。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 风险投资家 风险企业家 激励机制 美国 年薪契约结构 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5192(2001)01-0050-04 |
Study of Incentive Mechanism in Venture Capital |
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| TANG Han- xiu,L I Zhan.Study of Incentive Mechanism in Venture Capital[J].Forecasting,2001,20(1):50-53,34. |
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| Authors: | TANG Han- xiu L I Zhan |
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| Abstract: | Incentive mechanism in venture capital has drawn m uch attention,and many qualitative, empirical and quantitative analysis and discussions have been proposed. However,there are few quantitative studies given. This paper analyzes quantitatively the current incentive mechanism in U .S. venture capital and the optimal effort level of the entrepreneur is given. The limitations of the current incentive mechanism in U.S. are pointed out. To overcome the limitations,a kind of new incentive mechanism is proposed. The comparison of analytical results proves that the current incentive mechanism in U .S. may not be the best choice,and that the proposed one in this paper can give a better motivation for entrepreneur's m anagement action. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital venture capitalist entrepreneur incentive mechanism |
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