| 风险投资中的代理问题、风险分担与制度安排 |
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| 引用本文： | 张帏,姜彦福,陈耀刚.风险投资中的代理问题、风险分担与制度安排[J].科研管理,2002,23(1):122-127. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张帏 姜彦福 陈耀刚 |
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| 作者单位： | 清华大学经济管理学院,北京,100084 |
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| 摘 要： | 信息不对称使得风险投资面临严重的代理问题，代理问题与风险企业（项目）的高不确定性又会导致风险投资的高失败率。恰当的制度安排能够降低代理成本和风险：一方面，风险投资家严格筛选高层管理团队，对他们采用强约束和适当的激励，并积极参与风险企业的管理，提供增值服务；另一方面，风险企业普遍采用全员持股这种组织激励方式。风险投资机制将监督、激励与风险分担有机地结合在一起，从而大大缓解了风险投资中的代理问题。论文还对我国风险投资业的发展提出一些相关建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 代理问题 风险分担 制度安排 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-2995(2002)01-006-0122 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001年7月19日 |
Agency Problem,Risk Sharing and Institution Arrangement in Venture Capital |
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| Zhang Wei,Jiang Yan fu,Chen Yao gang.Agency Problem,Risk Sharing and Institution Arrangement in Venture Capital[J].Science Research Management,2002,23(1):122-127. |
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| Authors: | Zhang Wei Jiang Yan fu Chen Yao gang |
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| Abstract: | Asymmetric information and high uncertainty associated with the entrepreneurial firms lead to high failure rate in venture capital investment. The mechanism of incentives and constraints developed in Venture Capital Industry is studied in this paper. It concludes that appropriate incentives, strong constaints and risk sharing are combined in venture capital investment, which greatly mitigate the agency problem and alleviate agency cost, risk. This paper also briefly analyzes the situation of China's Venture Capital Industry and provides some advice to its development. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital agency problem risk sharing institution arrangement |
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