| 最终控制权、现金流权与上市公司过度投资 |
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| 引用本文： | 彭文伟,冉茂盛,周姝.最终控制权、现金流权与上市公司过度投资[J].软科学,2009,23(12):126-129. |
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| 作者姓名： | 彭文伟 冉茂盛 周姝 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044 |
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| 摘 要： | 以最终控制权大于10%的215家上市公司为样本,对最终控制权、现金流权与过度投资的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明:现金流权、最终控制权均对过度投资有抑制作用;最终控制权与现金流权分离时,最终控制人倾向于过度投资以实现隧道效应,因此,降低上市公司最终控制权、现金流权分离程度可以提高投资效率。
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| 关 键 词： | 控制权 现金流权 最终控制人 过度投资 |
Ultimate Control Rights, Cash Flow Rights and Over-investment of China s Listed Companies |
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| PENG Wen-wei,RAN Mao-sheng,ZHOU Shu.Ultimate Control Rights, Cash Flow Rights and Over-investment of China s Listed Companies[J].Soft Science,2009,23(12):126-129. |
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| Authors: | PENG Wen-wei RAN Mao-sheng ZHOU Shu |
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| Abstract: | With a sample of 215 listed companies whose proportion of ultimate control rights is more than 10%,this paper analyzes the relationship between ultimate control rights,cash flow rights and over-investment behavior.Results show that cash flow rights restrains the over-investment behavior,which verifies the incentive effect of cash flow rights.Ultimate control rights have restriction on over-investment,perhaps because balance structure ownership and external supervision.Otherwise,when ultimate control rights separate from cash flow rights,ultimate owner will be apt to carry out over-investment behavior and tunneling behavior. |
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| Keywords: | ultimate control rights cash flow rights ultimate owner over-investment behavior |
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