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| 最优专利授权期模型的设计研究 | |
| 引用本文： | 杜洪旭,吴敏,夏云飞.最优专利授权期模型的设计研究[J].软科学,2003,17(6):18-20. |
| 作者姓名： | 杜洪旭 吴敏 夏云飞 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 四川省工业技术创新中心,四川,成都,610041 2. 四川大学,四川,成都,610065 3. 光大国际,广东,深圳,518000 |
| 摘 要： | 在技术创新过程中何时授予企业以专利权,既关系到专家政策的制定又涉及创新机制的设计。本文把企业间专利竞争设计为多阶段动态规划模型,在双寡头垄断阶段是Stackberg博弈过程,在完全垄断阶段企业继续进行技术创新,专利局以最大化社会剩余并给企业一定的收益来激励其创新活动,最后对模型中的重要参数进行探讨研究。 |
| 关 键 词： | 专利竞争 动态规划模型 Stackberg博弈 专利授权期 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-8409(2003)06-0018-03 |
The Research on Design the Model of Optimal Patent Authorization Period |
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| DU Hong-xu,WU MIN,XIA Yun-fei.The Research on Design the Model of Optimal Patent Authorization Period[J].Soft Science,2003,17(6):18-20. | |
| Authors: | DU Hong-xu WU MIN XIA Yun-fei |
| Institution: | DU Hong-xu1,WU MIN2,XIA Yun-fei3 |
| Abstract: | The issue of when to authorize the enterprises the patent right in the course of technological innovation, is related not only to the setting up of pa tent policy but also to the designing of innovation mechanism. The paper designs the patent competition among the enterprises to be a multi-stage dynamic progra mming model. In the stage of double oligopoly, it is a Stackberg game process; i n the stage of entire oligopoly, the technological innovation goes on, and the p atent office motivates the innovation activities by maximum social surplus and b ringing a certain benefits to enterprises. Finally, the authors study and discus s some important parameters in the model. |
| Keywords: | patent competition dynamic programming model Stackberg game patent a uthorization period |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |