| 统治者利益最大化与农业产出最小化--南京国民政府失败的制度分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨光斌.统治者利益最大化与农业产出最小化--南京国民政府失败的制度分析[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2005,44(6):11-18. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨光斌 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国人民大学,国际关系学院,北京,100872 |
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| 摘 要： | 南京国民政府继承的危机性国家结构、在民族国家建设中产生的国家与社会的危机以及由此形成的对抗性的阶级关系,使得为实现统治者利益最大化即政治统治需要的社会产出最大化政策即两次土地改革政策均告失败,最终导致南京国民政府雪崩式失败。南京国民政府的失败一方面经典地演绎了诺思的“国家悖论”即统治者租金最大化与社会产出最大化之间的内在冲突,一方面也丰富着“国家悖论”,因为是统治者内部的结构性利益冲突使社会产出最大化的政策不能实现并由此导致整体性统治租金的耗散。
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| 关 键 词： | 国家结构 民族国家建设 土地制度 国家悖论 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-2456(2005)06-0011-08 |
| 收稿时间： | 06 21 2005 12:00AM |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年6月21日 |
The Maximum Of Ruler's Interest And Minimum Of Land Production --An Institutional Analysis Of The Nanjing National Government Failure |
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| YANG Guang-bin.The Maximum Of Ruler''s Interest And Minimum Of Land Production --An Institutional Analysis Of The Nanjing National Government Failure[J].Journal of Central China Normal University(Humanities and Social Sciences),2005,44(6):11-18. |
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| Authors: | YANG Guang-bin |
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| Institution: | College of International Relations, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China |
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| Abstract: | The Nanjing National Government inherited crises of state structure and state-society derived from the national building and produced conflicting class relations because of its political nature,which to led the failure of two land reforms that would strengthen political rule and thus maximize the ruler's interest,and finally the total collapse of the regime.On one hand,this historical story classically testifies D.North's "the state dilemma" that is the born internal conflict of maximum of ruler's rent and maximum of social production;on the other hand,it makes North's theory more plentiful because it was internal structural conflict among the ruler's group that made land reforms failure and exhausted ruler's all rent. |
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| Keywords: | state structure national building land system the state dilemma |
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