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Ownership concentration and innovativeness of corporate ventures
Authors:Katrin Hussinger  Johannes MH Dick  Dirk Czarnitzki
Institution:1. University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg;2. Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim, Germany;3. Axa Insurances, Germany;4. K.U. Leuven, Belgium;5. Centre for R&D Monitoring at K.U. Leuven, Belgium
Abstract:Corporate venture investments are an established means for incumbent firms to access radical innovation. Drawing from a behavioural agency framework, we distinguish two mechanisms that govern the relationship between corporate venture investment and radical innovation, the safety net that corporate sponsors provide and control incentives. While the safety net induces a gap between the radical innovation success of corporate ventures (CVs) and ventures without a corporate sponsor, the superior radical innovation success of CVs decreases with the corporate sponsor’s incentives to control the venture. The impact of the safety net and control incentives further depends on the corporate sponsor’s position vis-à-vis her aspiration level.
Keywords:Corporate venture investment  Radical innovation  Incremental innovation  Ownership concentration  Behavioural agency model
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