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基于进化博弈论的城中村改造策略研究——以政府主导模式为例
引用本文:卢宗亮,汤惠君.基于进化博弈论的城中村改造策略研究——以政府主导模式为例[J].衡阳师范学院学报,2014(3):103-108.
作者姓名:卢宗亮  汤惠君
作者单位:华南农业大学公共管理学院,广东广州510640
基金项目:广州市国土资源和房屋管理局招标项目(H12114);连南瑶族自治县国土资源局招标项目(H10237)
摘    要:城中村是我国快速发展城市化进程的特有产物,其所暴露的问题日趋严重,具有进行改造的必要性。城中村的改造本质是利益的再分配,能否有效协调各利益相关者的利益是城中村改造的关键问题。该文以政府主导模式为例,并运用进化博弈论构造了政府、村民两个利益相关者参与的进化博弈模型,分析器博弈过程和均衡结果,针对其情况提出相应对策,为政府进行改造城中村提供理论依据。

关 键 词:城中村改造  进化博弈论  政府主导模式

On Renovation Strategy of Urban Villages Based on Evolutionary Game Theory-Taking the government-leading model as an example
LU Zong-liang,TANG Hui-jun.On Renovation Strategy of Urban Villages Based on Evolutionary Game Theory-Taking the government-leading model as an example[J].journal of Hengyang Normal University,2014(3):103-108.
Authors:LU Zong-liang  TANG Hui-jun
Institution:(College of Public Management, South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou Guangdong 510640, China)
Abstract:The urban village is a special product of China's rapid urbanization process ,The problems of urban villages are getting more and more serious and it is necessary to reform .The transformation of the urban villages is how to redistribute the essentially interests ,therefore whether we can coordinate the various interests of different people is important for the success of the process .This paper takes the government-leading model as an example ,by using evolutionary game theory .The purpose is to analyze the game process between government and the villagers .The paper proposed corresponding countermeasures according to the situation to provide theoretical basis for the government to reconstruct urban villages .
Keywords:urban village reconstruction  evolutionary game theory  government-leading model
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