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国内大循环下公众监督对污染产业区际转移的抑制效应
引用本文:丁绪辉,常婷.国内大循环下公众监督对污染产业区际转移的抑制效应[J].资源科学,2022,44(6):1212-1223.
作者姓名:丁绪辉  常婷
作者单位:1.江苏大学财经学院,镇江 212013
2.江苏大学产业经济研究院,镇江 212013
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究项目(21YJC790021);江苏省社会科学基金青年项目(18GLC002);江苏省高校哲学社会科学优秀创新团队建设项目(SJSZ2020-20)
摘    要:随着对美好生活的向往日益强烈,社会公众越来越积极地参与环境污染治理,公众监督已成为弥补固有环境规制政策工具的有效手段;国内大循环下区际产业转移更加活跃与频繁,如何引导公众监督、如何有效抑制污染产业区际转移成为更加迫切的现实课题。本文从防范污染产业区际转移的视角出发,采用偏离份额分析法测度中国省级层面污染产业转移规模,构建系统广义矩估计(SYS-GMM)模型检验公众监督是否能够直接或间接地抑制污染产业区际转移,并与命令控制、市场激励型等传统环境政策工具进行对比分析。研究结论显示:①人大政协环境提案与公众环境问题投诉两种形式的公众监督,均可直接有效抑制污染产业区际转移。②公众监督提升了命令控制型与市场激励型环境规制的作用效果,在提升综合环境规制效能方面,公众环境问题投诉的作用效果是人大政协环境提案的4倍,两种类型公众监督之间还存在显著的协同效应。③两种类型公众监督在经济发达地区和经济欠发达地区均能显著抑制污染产业转移,公众环境问题投诉在欠发达地区效果更显著,并且其抑制效应是人大政协环境提案的2倍。鉴于此,应积极发挥社会公众环境监督作用,畅通公众监督的常态化与制度化渠道,强化地方政府产业承接转移与环境治理的问责机制,规避地方政府间“逐底竞争”,同时构建环境多元治理体系,合理引导产业有序转移与转型升级。

关 键 词:污染产业转移  公众监督  命令控制型环境规制  市场激励型环境规制  国内大循环  偏离份额分析法  中国  
收稿时间:2022-01-10
修稿时间:2022-03-11

The restraining effect of public supervision on the interregional transfer of polluting industries under the domestic circulation
DING Xuhui,CHANG Ting.The restraining effect of public supervision on the interregional transfer of polluting industries under the domestic circulation[J].Resources Science,2022,44(6):1212-1223.
Authors:DING Xuhui  CHANG Ting
Institution:1. School of Finance and Economics, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
2. Institute of Industrial Economics, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
Abstract:With the growing yearning for a better life, the public in China is increasingly more actively involved in environmental pollution control. Public supervision has become an effective means to complement the existing environmental regulation policy tools. How to effectively restrain the interregional transfer of polluting industries under the domestic circulation has become an urgent practical issue. From the perspective of preventing the interregional transfer of polluting industries, this study used the shift share analysis method to measure the transfer scale of pollution industries at the provincial level in China. We built a systematic Gaussian mixture model (GMM) to test whether public supervision can directly or indirectly inhibit the interregional transfer of polluting industries, and the results were compared with traditional environmental policy tools such as command and control and market incentive. The research results show that: (1) The two forms of public supervision—environmental proposals of the provincial People’s Congress and the CPPCC and the complaints of the public on environmental problems—can directly and effectively inhibit the interregional transfer of polluting industries. (2) Public supervision can improve the effect of command and control and market incentive environmental regulations. In terms of improving the efficiency of comprehensive environmental regulation, the effect of public environmental complaints is four times that of the environmental proposals of the provincial People’s Congress and the CPPCC. There is also a significant synergy between the two types of public supervision. (3) The two types of public supervision can significantly inhibit the transfer of polluting industries in both economically developed and economically underdeveloped areas. The effect of public environmental complaints is more significant in less developed areas, where its inhibitory effect is twice that of the environmental proposals of the provincial People’s Congress and the CPPCC. In view of this, we should give full play to the role of public environmental supervision and unblock the normalization and institutionalization channels of public supervision, strengthen the accountability mechanism for local governments to undertake industrial transfer and environmental governance, and avoid the “race to the bottom competition” between local governments. At the same time, we should build a diversified environmental governance system to reasonably guide the orderly transfer, transformation, and upgrading of industries.
Keywords:transfer of polluting industries  public supervision  command and control environmental regulation  market incentive environmental regulation  domestic circulation  shift share analysis  China  
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