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基于产权攫取的国有企业改革研究
引用本文:戚振东,孙晓华,曹建安,段兴民.基于产权攫取的国有企业改革研究[J].预测,2008,27(1):17-22.
作者姓名:戚振东  孙晓华  曹建安  段兴民
作者单位:西安交通大学,管理学院,陕西,西安,710049
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70471038)
摘    要:运用产权攫取分析框架研究了国有资本经营链上的政府代理人、国有企业经营者和职工的产权攫取行为,认为产权攫取导致较高交易成本是国有企业存在诸多问题的一个根本原因,这种产权攫取不仅体现在人力资本的非效率投资方面,也体现在对非人力资产的产权攫取方面,后者对于转轨时期我国的国有企业改革可能更具有现实指导意义。本文从非人力资产产权攫取治理角度提出了完善国有企业改革的若干思路。

关 键 词:产权攫取  国有企业  改革
文章编号:1003-5192(2008)01-0017-06
收稿时间:2007-02-15
修稿时间:2007年2月15日

Research on Reform of SOEs Based on the Theory of Property Rights Capture
QI Zhen-dong,SUN Xiao-hua,CAO Jian-an,DUAN Xin-min.Research on Reform of SOEs Based on the Theory of Property Rights Capture[J].Forecasting,2008,27(1):17-22.
Authors:QI Zhen-dong  SUN Xiao-hua  CAO Jian-an  DUAN Xin-min
Abstract:This article used the property capture theoretical framework to studies the character of three party's property rights capture behavior in State-owned enterprises.It argues that property rights capture in public firms increases the internal transaction cost of SOEs.Higher internal transaction costs were the main reasons to the existence of those problems of state companies.Those property rights captures not only include inefficient human capital investments,but also include non-human assets capture.The article insisted the latter may be do more sense to the reform of Chinese SOEs,some remedial strategies were proposed.
Keywords:property rights capture  state-owned enterprises  reform
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