| 财政科研项目间接费用的激励约束机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 肖小溪,唐福杰.财政科研项目间接费用的激励约束机制研究[J].科研管理,2021,42(6):159-165. |
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| 作者姓名： | 肖小溪 唐福杰 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院，北京100190；
2.中国科学院大学公共政策与管理学院，北京100049；
3.国家自然科学基金委员会财务局，北京100085；
4.中央财经大学会计学院，北京100081 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金：“基于信用评级的科学基金间接费用核定研究”（J1824101，2018.08—2019.12）。 |
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| 摘 要： | 信用管理与间接费用挂钩是未来我国财政科研项目资金管理落实“放管服”要求的重要政策工具，其根本目的是优化财政科研项目间接费用管理、建立有效的激励约束机制。基于委托代理理论中的激励约束框架，对美国、英国和中国财政科研项目间接费用中的激励和约束机制分别展开分析，并在三个国家对比的基础上，构建引入信用管理后我国财政科研项目间接费用管理中的激励约束框架及关键点。
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| 关 键 词： | 信用管理 间接费用 激励 约束 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-06-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2020-10-22 |
A research on the incentive and restraint mechanism of indirect costs of government research projects |
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| Xiao Xiaoxi,Tang Fujie.A research on the incentive and restraint mechanism of indirect costs of government research projects[J].Science Research Management,2021,42(6):159-165. |
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| Authors: | Xiao Xiaoxi Tang Fujie |
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| Institution: | 1. Institutes of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;
2. School of Public Policy and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;
3. Bureau of Finance, National Natural Science Foundation of China, Beijing 100085, China;
4.School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China; |
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| Abstract: | At present, the key problem in governmental research project funding management in China is how to establish an effective incentive and restraint mechanism. From the perspective of the incentives mechanism, in recent years, the introduction of indirect costs has replaced the previous management overhead fees. Besides this, currently performance allowance is permitted in indirect costs, and the limit of personnel costs proportion is abolished, all of which demonstrate that China′s governmental research funding management has entered a new stage characterized by incentive orientation and strengthen the financial autonomy of project performers such as universities and research institutes. However, there are still some challenges to be addressed. For example, as the policy barriers from the central government have been removed, how to make sure researchers really benefit from this? Compared with the value of equipment and infrastructure, the value of human resources has been underestimated in project funding management for a long time. How to truly reflect the creativity of scientific researchers in indirect costs of the governmental research project?
From the perspective of constraint mechanism, the responsibility of the project performing organizations such as universities and research institutes has increased after the emphasis of financial autonomy for these organizations. How to effectively restrict the project performing organizations from illegal behaviors, and make sure they will undertake the responsibility to make the governmental project′s funds legally and effectively managed? At the national level, in recent years it is required to implement the credit management of scientific research projects and promote the verification of indirect costs of scientific research projects by linking it with the credits of the performing organizations. In fact, it is necessary and important to link the credit management with the indirect costs, so as to effectively encourage the performing organizations and researchers to make the best use of the governmental project funds, and also restrict them from illegal behaviors. In another word, linking credit with indirect costs management is vital to build effective incentive and restraint mechanism in governmental project funding management, and solve the above problems.
It can be seen that under the trend of credit management, how to establish an effective incentive and restraint mechanism through the indirect costs of financial research projects is not only an important theoretical research topic in indirect cost management, but also an important policy topic. The existing studies about the indirect costs management of governmental research projects, mainly introduced domestic and foreign practical experiences. In-depth theoretical analysis on how to establish an effective and balanced incentive and constraint mechanism is rare in these studies. Therefore, these studies have limited value in inspiring China′s mechanism design. Based on the incentive and restraint framework of the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes and compares the incentive and restraint mechanisms in the indirect costs management of governmental research projects in the United States, Britain and China. Then the necessity and importance of establishing the incentive and restraint mechanism by linking the credit management with the indirect costing of governmental research projects in China are illustrated. Finally, this paper puts forward the basic framework and key points to improve the indirect costs management of governmental research projects in China under the trend of credit management, so as to play a supporting role in the construction of effective incentive and restraint mechanism in governmental research project fund management. |
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| Keywords: | credit management indirect costs incentive restraint |
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