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| 会计信息披露政策选择的博弈分析 | |
| 引用本文： | 陈晓昱,周敬华,朱道才.会计信息披露政策选择的博弈分析[J].安徽广播电视大学学报,2005(3):19-22. |
| 作者姓名： | 陈晓昱 周敬华 朱道才 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 洛阳经济学校,河南,洛阳,471002 2. 江汉石油管理局,湖北,潜江,433124 3. 安徽广播电视大学,安徽,合肥,230022 |
| 摘 要： | 会计政策选择是作为理性“经济人”主体的企业的必然行为,不仅能为企业带来一定的经济利益,而且又影响企业利益相关者的经济利益。在委托一代理方式下,由于信息的不对称性和利益的驱使,会计政策选择带有明显的博弈特征。所以,研究会计信息披露政策选择问题,揭示会计信息披露政策的搏弈主体及其行为特征、博弈过程,推导出博弈均衡,具有非常重要的意义。 |
| 关 键 词： | 会计政策选择 会计信息披露 博弈分析 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-6021（2005）03-0019-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-06-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年6月4日 |
Game Analysis on Enterprise Accounting Information Disclosure Policy Alternation |
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| CHEN Xiao-yu,Zhou Jing-hua,ZHU Dao-cai.Game Analysis on Enterprise Accounting Information Disclosure Policy Alternation[J].Journal of Anhui Television University,2005(3):19-22. | |
| Authors: | CHEN Xiao-yu Zhou Jing-hua ZHU Dao-cai |
| Abstract: | As the inevitable behavior of enterprise, rational "economic entity", accounting policy choice can not only bring certain economic benefits to enterprises but also influence the economic benefits of the relatives of enterprises. Under the way of trust-procurator, accounting policy choice appears obvious games characteristics because of information asymmetry and interests drive. Therefore, it is significant to study accounting information disclosure policy choice to disclose behavior characteristics and procedure of game entities of accounting information disclosure policy, further deducing to game equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | accounting policy choice accounting information disclosure game analysis |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |