| 风险投资公司激励约束机制的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 柯健.风险投资公司激励约束机制的博弈分析[J].辽宁师范大学学报(社会科学版),2010,33(1):33-36. |
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| 作者姓名： | 柯健 |
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| 作者单位： | 中共江西省委党校,经济学教研部,江西,南昌,330003 |
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| 摘 要： | 我国风险投资公司普遍存在着风险投资家显性激励不足，风险投资缺乏必要的激励约束手段，为了规范我国的风险投资事业，有必要进行激励约束机制创新。建立激励约束的博弈模型，使风险投资家在激励相容约束和参与约束的条件下，通过契约设计实现自己的收益最大化。风险投资公司应建立起更加合理的显性激励机制，才能更好地促进风险投资事业的发展。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资公司 激励约束机制 博弈分析 |
Game Analysis of the Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms of Venture Capital Firms |
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| KE Jian.Game Analysis of the Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms of Venture Capital Firms[J].Journal of Liaoning Normal University(Social Science Edition),2010,33(1):33-36. |
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| Authors: | KE Jian |
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| Institution: | Teaching and Research Department of Economics/a>;Party School of CPC Jiangxi Provincial Committee/a>;Nanchang 330003/a>;China |
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| Abstract: | China's venture capitalists in venture capital firm lack explicit incentives,and venture capital lacks the necessary means of incentive and restriction.It is necessary to carry out innovative incentive and restraint mechanisms in order to regulate China's venture capital business.The establishment of incentive and restriction of the game model makes venture capitalists maximize their earnings in the incentive compatibility constraint and participation constraint condition through contract design.Venture cap... |
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| Keywords: | venture capital firms incentive and restraint mechanisms game analysis |
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