| 农村集体经营性建设用地入市中村委会寻租行为的监督博弈模型 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘靖羽 尹奇 唐宏 张湛 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400000;2.四川农业大学管理学院, 成都 611130 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学基金（13YJA630044，17YJA630124）资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 为更有效地抑制在农村集体经营性建设用地入市中村委会的寻租行为，构建地方监督机构与村委会之间的监督博弈模型，通过对博弈均衡解和影响均衡解的各个参数变量的探讨，分析影响中国农村集体经营性建设用地入市中寻租和监察行为的因素。结果显示：村委会选择寻租策略的概率受地方监督机构的成本、严格监察概率、查出概率（不严格监察概率）、扭曲效应及惩罚力度的影响。地方监督机构选择严格监察的概率受监察力度、查出概率（不严格监察时/严格监察时）的影响。因而，应当形成以国家和社会相结合的监督模式，畅通公共群众社会监督渠道，降低地方监督机构的监察成本；同时通过国家行政立法完善网络化监督；最后应当从政治和经济两个方面增强惩戒力度。
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| 关 键 词： | 农村集体经营性建设用地 村委会 寻租行为 监督博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017-05-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2017-11-20 |
A supervisory game model for village committees' behavior in the marketilization of rural commercial collective-owned construction land |
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| Authors: | LIU Jingyu YIN Qi TANG Hong ZHANG Zhan |
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| Institution: | 1.School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400000, China;2.School of Management, Sichuan Agricultural University, Chengdu 611130, China |
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| Abstract: | In order to suppress the village committees' rent-seeking behavior effectively, this study establishes a supervision game model between the local supervisory authorities and village committees, and analyzes the factors that affect the rent-seeking and supervising behavior of rural collective management land in China. The results show that the probability of selecting a rent-seeking strategy by the village committees is affected by the cost of the local supervisory authority, the probability of strict supervision, the probability of detection (the probability of no strict monitor), and the effects of distortion and punishment. The probability of strict monitor by the local supervisory authorities is affected by the probability of detection (the probability of no strict monitor/strict monitor) and the punishment. Therefore, this study suggests that a combination model of national and social supervision is needed to smooth the channels of public supervision and reduce the monitoring cost of the local supervisory authorities. At the same time, the network monitoring should be improved by the national administrative legislation. Finally, the punishment from the political and economic aspects should be strengthened. |
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| Keywords: | rural commercial collective-owned construction land village committees rent-seeking behavior supervision game |
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