| 信息不对称下的体育经纪委托—代理激励模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 李海,刘梅英.信息不对称下的体育经纪委托—代理激励模型[J].天津体育学院学报,2006,21(3):229-231. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李海 刘梅英 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 上海体育学院,管理系,上海,200438
2. 河南大学,体育部,开封,475001 |
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| 基金项目： | 上海市重点学科建设项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 体育经纪人拥有运动员察觉不到的私人信息，运动员面临的问题是如何根据观测到的一些信息通过一套激励机制来激发经纪人为其努力工作。委托—代理激励模型正是为分析非对称信息情况下的最优合同而建立的。
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| 关 键 词： | 体育经纪人 委托-代理 信息不对称 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-0000（2006）03-0229-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-01-16 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-01-162006-03-15 |
Study of the Incentive Model of Sports Agency in the Principal- agent Relationship under Asymmetric
Information |
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| LI Hai,LIU Mei-ying.Study of the Incentive Model of Sports Agency in the Principal- agent Relationship under Asymmetric
Information[J].Journal of Tianjin Institute of Physical Education,2006,21(3):229-231. |
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| Authors: | LI Hai LIU Mei-ying |
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| Institution: | 1. Dept. of Sports Management, Shanghai Institute of Physical Education, Shanghai 200438, China; 2.Dept. of PE, Henan University, Kaifeng 475001, China |
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| Abstract: | Sports agents possess lots of private information which the athletes don't know.Athletes should mount a set of incentive system to inspirit sports agents throughout any information they observed.Principal-agent incentive model was set up based on analyzing optimal contracts of information asymmetry. |
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| Keywords: | sports agents principal-agent information asymmetry |
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