| 委托—代理关系下职业联赛裁判员的激励约束机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王健.委托—代理关系下职业联赛裁判员的激励约束机制研究[J].天津体育学院学报,2005,20(3):72-74. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王健 |
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| 作者单位： | 河南师范大学,体育学院,新乡,453007 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用西方经济学有关理论,对职业联赛中职业体育协会与裁判员之间的委托—代理关系进行分析,指出,“黑哨”是裁判员作为代理人道德风险的一种表现;决定裁判员“黑哨”行为的主要因素有:“黑哨”收益、裁判员执法津贴、“黑哨”行为被发现和惩处的概率、“黑哨”行为被惩处后的收入等。预防和避免裁判员道德风险的关键在于建立一套行之有效的激励约束机制。为此,应提高裁判员执法津贴;加强监督,加大对违规裁判员的惩罚力度;推进裁判职业化;实行裁判员年薪制;建立裁判员职业声誉评价体制和机制;加强对裁判员的精神激励。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托—代理关系 裁判员 道德风险 激励约束机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-0000(2005)03-0072-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年7月19日 |
Research on the Incentive-constraint System for the Referees of Professional Sport Leagues |
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| WANG Jian.Research on the Incentive-constraint System for the Referees of Professional Sport Leagues[J].Journal of Tianjin Institute of Physical Education,2005,20(3):72-74. |
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| Authors: | WANG Jian |
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| Institution: | School of PE; Henan Normal University; Xinxiang 453007; China |
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| Abstract: | Applying the relevant theories of economics, the authors analyzed the principal-agent relationship between the professional sport associations and the referees. The authors regarded it a kind of moral hazard for the referees blowing "black whistles". The author also points out that the main factors influencing the referees blowing "black whistles" include the revenue for blowing "black whistles", the legal wage from the professional sport associations, the probability being caught in, and the revenue after being dismissed for their behaviors. In order to prevent the referees from blowing "black whistles", we should take some effective measures to encourage and constrain the referees, such as increasing the legal wage, enhancing supervising to the referees, building the referees reputation evaluating system, carrying out professional referees systems, and so on. |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent relationship referee moral hazard incentive-constraint system |
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