| 基于完全信息动态博弈的经营激励约束机制与重组绩效的模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 武文超,丁业震,范志清.基于完全信息动态博弈的经营激励约束机制与重组绩效的模型研究[J].科技管理研究,2011,31(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 武文超 丁业震 范志清 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 南开大学经济学院,天津,300072
2. 国家开发银行天津市分行,天津,300072 |
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| 摘 要： | 在现代化的公司结构当中,所有者越来越少参与企业的日常运作和管理,经营者在某种程度上成为了企业的实际控制者,当企业重组的时候,二者目标的不一致会损害企业所有者的权益.在完全信息动态博弈的框架下,分析了企业重组当中的委托代理问题,对重组过程中对经营者进行激励和约束的问题得到了一些启发和结论.
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| 关 键 词： | 激励机制 约束机制 企业重组 |
Model on Corporation Incentives and Constraint Mechanism with the Restructure Performance Based on Dynamic Game with Complete Information |
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| WU Wenchao,DING Yezhen,FAN Zhiqing.Model on Corporation Incentives and Constraint Mechanism with the Restructure Performance Based on Dynamic Game with Complete Information[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2011,31(2). |
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| Authors: | WU Wenchao DING Yezhen FAN Zhiqing |
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| Institution: | WU Wenchao1,DING Yezhen1,FAN Zhiqing2(1.College of Economics,Nankai University,Tianjin 300072,China,2.China Development Bank Tianjin Branch,China) |
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| Abstract: | In modern corporations,fewer stock owners participate in the operation and management works.Managers have become the actual controller of corporations somehow.When corporation restructured,the inconsistency between the goals of owners and managers will violate the owners' right.In this paper,we analyze the agency problem in corporation restructuring under dynamic game framework with complete information,and get some conclusion of the incentive and constraint problem on managers in corporation restructure. |
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| Keywords: | incentives constraint mechanism corporate restructuring |
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