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晋升激励下地方政府虚假绩效信息产生与治理
引用本文:魏四新,郭立宏.晋升激励下地方政府虚假绩效信息产生与治理[J].科技管理研究,2011,31(6).
作者姓名:魏四新  郭立宏
作者单位:西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安,710048
摘    要:伴随着我国地方政府绩效管理实践的推进,在晋升激励机制下便出现了虚假绩效信息,对其治理便成为一个重要课题.主要分析了在晋升竞争的环境下地方政府虚报绩效信息动因和虚假信息存在负外部性,根据分析和讨论的结果,提出了治理地方政府绩效管理中虚假绩效信息的对策和建议,以促进我国地方政府绩效管理健康发展.

关 键 词:绩效评估  虚假信息  地方政府  晋升激励

Appearance and Management of Fake Performance Information of Local Governments under the Promotion Incentive
WEI Sixin,GUO Lihong.Appearance and Management of Fake Performance Information of Local Governments under the Promotion Incentive[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2011,31(6).
Authors:WEI Sixin  GUO Lihong
Institution:WEI Sixin,GUO Lihong (School of Economics and Management,Xi'an University of Technology,Xi'an 710048,China)
Abstract:With the development of the performance management practice of our local governments,there appears fake performance information under the mechanism of promotion incentive and it becomes a significant project.The paper mainly analyzes the causes of the appearance of fake performance information and its negative externality under the environment of competition.On the basis of the above analysis and discussion the author puts forward some countermeasures against the fake performance information in the performa...
Keywords:performance evaluation  fake information  local government  promotion incentive  
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