| 对董事长的失败惩罚促进了企业创新吗？ |
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| 引用本文： | 尹希盈.对董事长的失败惩罚促进了企业创新吗？[J].科研管理,2020,41(4):160-171. |
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| 作者姓名： | 尹希盈 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京大学商学院，江苏 南京210093 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文以2010-2016年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本，运用普通最小二乘法和固定效应估计法，探讨全样本和不同技术环境下的企业，失败惩罚和企业创新之间的关系。实证结果表明：对董事长的失败惩罚会提升企业创新的技术水平；失败惩罚和创新绩效之间正相关关系的结论在不同技术环境下具有一般性；进一步比较了失败惩罚与高、低科技企业的交互项系数之后发现，失败惩罚对企业创新的影响在低技术企业样本中显著于高技术企业。
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| 关 键 词： | 失败惩罚 强制变更 企业创新 技术环境 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-08-13 |
| 修稿时间： | 2019-02-27 |
Did the failure to punish the chairman promote enterprise innovation？#br# |
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| Yin Xiying.Did the failure to punish the chairman promote enterprise innovation？#br#[J].Science Research Management,2020,41(4):160-171. |
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| Authors: | Yin Xiying |
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| Institution: | School of Business, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, Jiangsu, China |
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| Abstract: | At present, China′s economic growth is at a critical stage from high-speed growth to high-quality development, it is in the tackling phase of the transformation of development mode, the optimization of economic structure organization and the transformation of development kinetic energy. An important indicator of economic development is production quality and efficiency, the 19th National Congress of the CPC stated that, we must insist on quality first and beneficial result first right now, focus on accelerating the construction of the real economy, technological innovation, modern finance, industrial system for the coordinated development of human resources, constantly enhance China′s economic innovation and competitiveness. It is known to all that the key to leading the high-quality and efficient development of the Chinese economy in the future lies in technological innovation., innovation is undoubtedly important for the long-term growth of the economy, and technology is the most important strategic resource in economic development, scientific and technological innovation is the primary driving force for economic development. In the long course of human history, every scientific and technological revolution will cause a change in the structure of social organizations, which will lead to a big leap in social economy, therefore, stressing that ‘Science and technology innovation is a strategic support for improving social productivity and comprehensive national strength, and must be placed at the core of the overall national development’. As a result, improving the technological innovation capabilities of enterprises is the key to successfully transforming China′s economic innovation drive. The improvement of the innovation performance of enterprises is conducive to maintaining the long-term sustainable development of the macro economy. The chairman, as the highest leader of the enterprise, presides over the production and management of the company, in the long-term development of an enterprise, it is necessary to make the correct strategic strategy at each step. Whether the company is innovating, the chairman is always the most critical factor. With the continuous improvement and development of the enterprise′s constraint mechanism and incentive mechanism, in the face of the punishment of innovation failure, the chairman will immediately make a relatively favorable strategic strategy to improve the company′s technological innovation ability and innovation performance. Therefore, in enterprise management, the constraint mechanism and incentive mechanism play a crucial moderating role between entrepreneurial innovation failure and the innovation performance of enterprises. Based on the perspective of failure penalty, this paper takes the A-share listed companies in China′s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2010 to 2016 as samples, select the corresponding incentive indicators and characteristic indicators from the chairman and the corporate level, using two estimation methods: ordinary least squares method and panel fixed effect estimation method. The two estimation methods of the law explore how enterprises in different sample situations and different technical environments, how the penalties imposed by the company on the failure of the chairman will affect the innovation enthusiasm and innovative behavior choices of the enterprise, this illustrates the relationship between failure punishment and corporate innovation performance. In order to explore the connection between them, first of all, this paper uses a model to estimate the possibility of failure to punish the chairman. Secondly, using the ordinary least squares method and panel fixed effect estimation methods to explore the relationship between the chairman′s failure penalty and corporate innovation performance. Once more, examine the interrelationship between failure punishment and corporate innovation performance in different technological environments. At length, in order to verify whether the conclusions are general, using the above two estimation methods and two-stage least squares method, test the relationship between conditional failure punishment and corporate innovation performance, and the relationship between conditional failure punishment and corporate innovation in different technological environments. And the simultaneous equation model is used to perform the robustness test.According to the results of empirical research in this paper, the following three conclusions were reached: First of all, for all companies in the sample, increasing the failure penalty for the chairman of the board can significantly enhance the technical level of the company′s innovative investment, at the same time, the restraint mechanism for term termination will largely promote the chairman to continuously improve and improve his own efforts and business capabilities. Under the pressure of failure punishment, the chairman will eventually choose innovative projects with high risks and high returns. Secondly, after further detailed research from the perspective of different industries, it is found that the conclusion that there is a positive correlation between failure punishment and innovation performance is general in different technological environments. In the case of poor business performance of the company, the chairman faces the risk of dismissal of term termination, has sufficient motivation to improve the enthusiasm of enterprise technology innovation, in an effort to make a difference in one′s tenure, as a result, the chairman′s choice of investment strategic decision-making behavior is more inclined to innovative projects that will bring breakthrough benefits to the company. In the end, after further comparing the failure penalty of the chairman with the interaction term coefficients of high-tech and low-tech companies, it is found that the impact of failure penalty on the innovation performance of enterprises is significantly higher in the sample of low-tech companies than in the sample of high-tech companies. It can be concluded that leaders of low-tech companies, in order to enable them to win in the fierce market competition environment, and quickly grow into large-scale technology companies, leaders of low-tech enterprises are likely to turn pressure into motivation and strive for technological breakthroughs. Therefore, the policy implication of this paper is that companies should improve the restraint mechanism for the failure of the chairman and match the development of the technology market. Faced with the risks and uncertainties of enterprises in the innovation process, entrepreneurs need to be alert to identify risks and actively take risks. Responding to innovation failures requires innovative entrepreneurs to make full use of the positive impact of entrepreneurship on corporate innovation performance. |
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| Keywords: | failure penalty mandatory change enterprise innovation technology environment |
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