| 股权集中度、管理者薪酬组合与自主创新投资 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘振,刘博.股权集中度、管理者薪酬组合与自主创新投资[J].科研管理,2018,39(12):95-102. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘振 刘博 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.郑州航空工业管理学院会计学院，河南 郑州450046；
2.纽卡斯尔大学商学院，英国 纽卡斯尔 NE17RU |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金项目：“高管薪酬契约设计、研发配置优化与公司价值创造”（13BGL051，起止时间: 2013.06-2017.06）；河南省软科学重点项目：“郑州航空港财政科技投入优化路径研究” （162400410011，起止时间：2016.01-2018.12）；教育部人文社科项目：“影响中国高新技术企业R&D投资水平的公司治理要素、机制和路径研究”（11YJA630070，起止时间: 2011.11-2014.12）；河南省普通高等学校人文社会科学重点研究基地资助项目和2014 年度河南省高校科技创新人才(人文社科类) 支持项目。
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| 摘 要： | 基于代理理论和创新理论，探讨股权集中度对高新技术企业自主创新投资的影响。本文以中国A股上市高新技术企业为样本，运用联立方程组模型和三阶段最小二乘法，实证分析了不同控制权性质企业，股权集中度、管理者薪酬组合与企业自主创新投资之间的关系。研究结果显示：（1）在国有控股高新技术企业，股权集中度越高，管理者货币薪酬越高，股权薪酬越低，较低的股权薪酬诱导管理者提高货币薪酬；在非国有控股高新技术企业，股权集中度越高，管理者货币薪酬越低，股权薪酬越高，较高的股权薪酬强化了管理者提高货币薪酬的权力。（2）在国有控股高新技术企业，增加货币薪酬会诱导管理者降低企业自主创新投资，而在非国有控股高新技术企业，增加货币薪酬会激励管理者提高企业自主创新投资；在国有控股或非国有控股高新技术企业，管理者股权薪酬对企业自主创新投资均具有“N型”影响关系。
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| 关 键 词： | 股权集中度 货币薪酬 股权薪酬 自主创新投资 高新技术企业 |
| 收稿时间： | 2016-03-14 |
| 修稿时间： | 2018-02-17 |
Ownership concentration,managerial compensation package and independent innovation investment |
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| Liu Zhen,Liu Bo.Ownership concentration,managerial compensation package and independent innovation investment[J].Science Research Management,2018,39(12):95-102. |
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| Authors: | Liu Zhen Liu Bo |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Accounting, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 450046, Henan, China；;
2. School of Business, Newcastle University, Newcastle NE17RU, UK |
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| Abstract: | Based on the agency theory and innovation theory, we analyze the effect of ownership concentration on independent innovation investment in high-tech enterprises. Taking A-share listed high-tech enterprises in China as a sample, using simultaneous-equation models and three-stage least-squares method, this papers empirically analyses the relationships among ownership concentration, managerial compensation package and independent innovation investment in enterprises of different control rights. The research results indicate that: (1) in state-owned high-tech enterprises, the higher the ownership concentration, the higher the managerial monetary compensation and the lower the equity compensation，and lower equity compensation further induces manager to raise monetary compensation; while in non-state-owned high-tech enterprises, the higher the ownership concentration, the lower the managerial monetary compensation and the higher the equity compensation，and higher equity compensation further strengthens the managerial power to raise monetary compensation. (2) In state-owned high-tech enterprises, increasing monetary compensation will induce managers to reduce the independent innovation investment, but in non-state-owned high-tech enterprise, increasing monetary compensation will encourage managers to increase the independent innovation investment; in both the state-owned and non-state-owned high-tech enterprises, the managers' equity compensation has an "N-type" impact relationship on independent innovation investment. |
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| Keywords: | ownership concentration monetary compensation equity compensation independent innovation investment high-tech enterprises |
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