| 控制权悖论、控制权成本补偿与公司R&D投资 |
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| 引用本文： | 冉戎,王丁,谢懿.控制权悖论、控制权成本补偿与公司R&D投资[J].科研管理,2015,36(8):86-95. |
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| 作者姓名： | 冉戎 王丁 谢懿 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 重庆大学公共管理学院, 重庆 400030;
2. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400030 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金项目(编号:12XGL020, 起止时间:2012.09-2015.09);中央高校基本科研业务费重大项目(编号:CQDXWL-2013-Z004, 起止时间:2013.09-2015.09);重庆市高等学校优秀人才支持计划(起止时间:2014.09-2016.09);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(编号:CDJSK11016;CDJRC10010012, 起止时间:2012.09-2015.09);国家自然科学基金(71372137, 71302117, 起止时间:2013.09-2015.09)。 |
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| 摘 要： | 在控制权悖论的理论背景下,以公司控股股东内在利益动机为切入点,对控股股东对高新技术企业RD投资决策的影响和机理进行了重新阐释,并以我国高新技术行业上市公司为样本进了实证检验和经济解释。研究发现:(1)控制权私利水平与公司RD投资支出和强度在整体上成倒U型关系;(2)不同类别控制权私利水平对公司RD投资显现出效用差异。具体而言,在适度类公司中,其控制权私利水平对RD投资支出(强度)显现出正边际效用,且呈边际效用递减趋势;在超额类公司中,其控制权私利水平对RD投资支出的边际效用高于适度组,但对投资强度的效用不明显,表明控股股东目的在于攫取超额控制权私利;在极低类公司样本中,其控制权私利水平对RD投资支出(强度)显现的边际效用低于适度组,说明极低控制权私利的激励效果不佳;(3)实际控制人性质的未对上述关系显现出影响差异。
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| 关 键 词： | 控股股东 合理控制权私利 R&D投资强度 R&D投资支出 |
| 收稿时间： | 2015-01-05 |
Control right paradox,compensations of control right cost and R&D investment |
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| Ran Rong,Wang Ding,Xie Yi.Control right paradox,compensations of control right cost and R&D investment[J].Science Research Management,2015,36(8):86-95. |
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| Authors: | Ran Rong Wang Ding Xie Yi |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Public Affair, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China;
2. Administration of Business and Management, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China |
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| Abstract: | Considering the perspective of Private Benefits of Control(PBC) Paradox, this paper has studied the effects and mechanism of the decisions on R&D investment of High and New Technology Enterprises presided by controlling shareholder with inner benefits motivation. We argue that, firstly, the level of PBC and R&D investment expenditure and intension mainly shows an inversed-U shape tendency. Secondly, there exists difference effects among different kinds of PBC. A positive incentive marginal effect of moderate PBC on R&D investment expenditure and intension is remarkably suggested in empirical tests following marginal decrease rule. Then, the same positive effect of excessive PBC on R&D investment expenditure is found, but excessive PBC does not show any effect on R&D investment intension. Moreover, the positive effect of low PBC on R&D investment expenditure and intension is very weak, and this suggests there is not any incentive effect on controlling shareholders. Lastly, there are not any interesting evidences if the ownership of actual controlling shareholders is involved in the empirical tests mentioned before. |
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| Keywords: | controlling shareholder moderate control benefits R&D investment intension R&D investment expenditure |
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