| 供应链企业间知识交易的关系契约机制:基于合作创新的研究视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈伟,张旭梅,宋寒.供应链企业间知识交易的关系契约机制:基于合作创新的研究视角[J].科研管理,2015,36(7):38-48. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈伟 张旭梅 宋寒 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 四川外国语大学 国别经济与国际商务研究中心, 重庆 400031;
2. 重庆大学 经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400044;
3. 重庆理工大学 工商管理学院, 重庆 400054 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金项目:关系和信任导向下供应链企业间知识共享的创新效应与实现机制研究(项目编号:13CGL013,起止时间:2013.06-2015.12);国家自然科学基金项目:知识密集型服务外包中的知识共享激励与知识资产争端协调机制研究(项目编号:71301182,起止时间:2013.09-2016.12);重庆市教委科学技术研究项目:合作创新视角下供应链企业间知识共享的治理机制及其实证研究(项目编号:KJ131003,起止时间:2013.06-2015.12)。 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于供应链合作创新视角,知识交易双方投入要素的无法验证性所引起的双边道德风险往往会阻碍知识交易的顺利进行。针对上述问题,运用委托代理理论设计了双边道德风险下供应链企业间知识交易的正式契约及关系契约激励机制。研究表明,双边道德风险下知识交易的正式契约无法有效激励交易双方共同投入;对于任意贴现因子,实施关系契约的知识交易量与供应链创新收益产出均不小于正式契约,且随着贴现因子的增大,关系契约的激励效果越显著;当贴现因子达到一定门槛值时,关系契约能有效激励交易双方投入及供应链创新收益产出达到最优。最后,通过数值算例验证了相关结论的有效性。
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 知识交易 合作创新 正式契约 关系契约 |
| 收稿时间： | 2014-01-10 |
A study on the relational contract of knowledge trading among members in the supply chain based on the perspective of cooperative innovation |
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| Chen Wei,Zhang Xumei,Song Han.A study on the relational contract of knowledge trading among members in the supply chain based on the perspective of cooperative innovation[J].Science Research Management,2015,36(7):38-48. |
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| Authors: | Chen Wei Zhang Xumei Song Han |
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| Institution: | 1. Research Center for International Business and Economy, Sichuan International Studies University, Chongqing 400031, China;
2. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
3. School of Business Administration, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China |
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| Abstract: | Based on the perspective of cooperative innovation in the supply chain, the double moral hazard in knowledge trading among members resulted by the intangibility and unverifiability of their resources input will hinder the smooth progress of knowledge trading. Aiming at the above-mentioned problem, formal contract and relational contract of knowledge trading are designed with principal-agent theory, and then the incentive effects of contracts are analyzed. The conclusions indicate that the formal contract cannot motivate their contribution in knowledge trading effectively; the transfer quantity of knowledge trading and innovation income of supply chain under the relational contract are not less than that under the formal contract for all discount rate; the incentive effectiveness of the relational contract is getting more obvious with the increase of discount rate. When the discount rate reaches a certain threshold value, the optimal resources input and innovation income can be achieved through relational contract. At last, the effectiveness of the conclusions is verified through numerical examples. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain knowledge trading cooperative innovation formal contract relational contract |
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