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经理人报酬制度的演变与比较分析
引用本文:郑国光,徐海波,李怀祖.经理人报酬制度的演变与比较分析[J].预测,2007,26(6):42-47.
作者姓名:郑国光  徐海波  李怀祖
作者单位:西安交通大学,管理学院,陕西,西安,710049
摘    要:自从职业经理人产生以来,经理人报酬制度基本可以分为四类:固定报酬制度、利润分成报酬制度、股权激励报酬制度与基于股东剩余索取权的报酬制度。报酬制度的产生与演变始终围绕着两个问题展开:分工专业化引发监督成本提高与不确定性加强带来的风险分担问题。随着监督成本越来越高,外部风险越来越大,经理人报酬制度必将向着经理人具有企业的最终剩余索取权而股东享有满意利润的方向发展。

关 键 词:经理人  报酬制度  剩余索取权  监督成本  风险分担
文章编号:1003-5192(2007)06-0042-06
收稿时间:2007-04-26
修稿时间:2007年4月26日

On Manager Compensation System Evolvement and Comparatively Analysis
ZHENG Guo-guang,XU Hai-bo,LI Huai-zu.On Manager Compensation System Evolvement and Comparatively Analysis[J].Forecasting,2007,26(6):42-47.
Authors:ZHENG Guo-guang  XU Hai-bo  LI Huai-zu
Abstract:From the beginning of professional manager,there are lots of researches about manager compensation systems;these systems can be divided into four classes: fixed compensation system,profit-allocation compensation system,stock-based compensation system,and pay based on the residual-claim.The naissance and evolvement of each compensation system is subject to two issues: the supervisory cost increasing as a result of specialization and the risk allocation as a result of environment uncertainty.With the ever increase of the supervisory cost and risk,manager compensation system will be based on the residual claim after the stockholder taking the fixed profit of the enterprise.
Keywords:manager  compensation system  the residual claim  supervisory cost  risk allocation
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