| 跟踪审计模式下大型工程合谋博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 程书萍,葛秋东,盛昭瀚,刘小峰.跟踪审计模式下大型工程合谋博弈分析[J].预测,2012(1):34-38. |
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| 作者姓名： | 程书萍 葛秋东 盛昭瀚 刘小峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京大学工程管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971061,70831002) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文基于信息论对竣工决算审计模式与跟踪审计模式下的大型工程合谋问题进行剖析,在此基础上构建合谋博弈模型,采用定性定量相结合的方法分析两种审计模式下业主、施工承包商和监理单位的决策行为及合谋条件。研究结果表明:监理单位独立性的丧失是竣工决算审计模式下合谋现象频发的根本原因,而在跟踪审计模式下,审计机构的提前介入保证了监理单位的独立性,打破了业主在工程建设中一方独大的局面,降低了合谋的可能性。此外,研究发现,大型工程规模越大,采用跟踪审计的必要性就越大。
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| 关 键 词： | 大型工程 合谋 信息不对称 竣工决算审计 跟踪审计 |
A Game Analysis of the Collusion in Large Construction Project under Follow-up Audit Pattern |
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| CHENG Shu-ping,GE Qiu-dong,SHENG Zhao-han,LIU Xiao-feng.A Game Analysis of the Collusion in Large Construction Project under Follow-up Audit Pattern[J].Forecasting,2012(1):34-38. |
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| Authors: | CHENG Shu-ping GE Qiu-dong SHENG Zhao-han LIU Xiao-feng |
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| Institution: | (School of Management and Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on information theory,this paper analyze the collusion problem involved in large construction projects under both final accounts audit pattern and follow-up audit pattern,on this basis,builds the game model of the collusion,by using both qualitative and quantitative methods,analyze the decision-making behaviors and collusion conditions of employers,construction contractors and supervision units under two audit patterns.The results show that,the blocking of the key information channel——supervision units,is the basic reason for frequent collusions,but under the follow-up audit pattern,the early intervention of audit organizations ensures the independence of supervision units,breaks the domination of employers in the project construction,reduces the possibility of collusions.In addition,the study finds that,the larger the scale of large-scale projects is,more necessary using follow-up audit is. |
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| Keywords: | large construction project collusion information asymmetry final accounts audit follow-up audit |
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