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贸易技术壁垒的博弈分析
引用本文:鲁文龙,陈宏民.贸易技术壁垒的博弈分析[J].预测,2003,22(4):62-64.
作者姓名:鲁文龙  陈宏民
作者单位:上海交通大学管理学院,上海,200030
基金项目:教育部博士点基金资助项目(20010248038)
摘    要:本文明确提出最小质量标准(MQS)可以作为贸易技术壁垒(TBT)来考虑,因为贸易技术壁垒的实质就是设定一个高于进口产品质量的标准,以阻碍进入。在此前提下,本文首先考虑了在一个开放的经济体中.企业的利润及社会福利随MQS的变化情况。其次,对开放和封闭经济体中的MQS作了比较。结果表明,输入国政府设定最小质量标准,会使得生产低质量产品的进入企业利润增加,生产高质量产品的在位企业利润减少.但输入国消费者剩余提高,且消费者剩余的增加幅度要大于本国企业利润的减少,因此社会福利增加,输入国政府有动机设定最小质量标准。

关 键 词:贸易技术壁垒  最小质量标准  产品质量  贸易自由化
文章编号:1003-5192(2003)04-0062-03

The Analysis of Technical Barrier to Trade with Game Theory
Abstract:The paper definitely shows that minimum quality standards (MQS) can be treated as technical barriers to trade (TBT) because TBT is to set a standard higher than the quality of imports essentially in order to block entry. In this premise, the paper firstly considered the change of firms' profits and social welfare with MQS in an open economy. Secondly the MQS in an open economy and a close are compared. The results are as follows: the import government set MQS, the profits of entry firm produced low quality products increases and incumbent firm produced high quality products decreases, yet consumer surplus increases. At the same time, the increase of consumer surplus is greater than the decrease of domestic firm's profits, so social welfare increases and the import government has incentive to set MQS.
Keywords:technical barriers to trade  minimum quality standards  product quality  trade liberalization
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