| 不完全信息下存货质押业务防合谋机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 何娟,王建,蒋祥林.不完全信息下存货质押业务防合谋机制设计[J].软科学,2012,26(8):141-144. |
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| 作者姓名： | 何娟 王建 蒋祥林 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西南交通大学 交通运输与物流学院,成都,610041
2. 复旦大学 金融研究院,上海,200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目，全国博士后基金项目，教育部博士点基金项目，四川省软科学计划项目，中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目，四川省教育厅人文社会科学研究基地(川酒发展研究中心)重点课题项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 引入不完全信息下的重复博弈理论,建立存货质押业务管理中考虑防范物流企业与借款企业合谋银行契约设计的重复博弈模型。结果显示,在银行与物流企业信息不对称的委托监管模式下,银行应与物流企业建立长期合作关系避免单次交易,使物流企业有追随声誉模型带来的隐性激励积极性。
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| 关 键 词： | 存货质押业务 不完全信息 重复博弈 防合谋 |
Mechanism Design of Avoiding Collusion in Inventory Financing under Incomplete Information |
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| HE Juan
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WANG Jian
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JIANG Xiang-lin.Mechanism Design of Avoiding Collusion in Inventory Financing under Incomplete Information[J].Soft Science,2012,26(8):141-144. |
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| Authors: | HE Juan WANG Jian JIANG Xiang-lin |
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| Institution: | 1.School of Traffic,Transportation & Logistics,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031; 2.Institute for Financial Studies,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433) |
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| Abstract: | In order to prevent the collusion between the logistics enterprise and the borrower in inventory financing for the commercial bank,the theory of repeated game and reputation effect of incomplete information are introduced and the repeated games model is set up between the bank and logistics enterprise.The main results show that the bank should establish long-term relationship with logistics enterprise to avoid the single transaction,so that logistics enterprises have to follow the positive reputation effect. |
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| Keywords: | inventory financing incomplete information repeated game avoid collusion |
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