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研发外包契约选择:基于事后效率的研究
引用本文:刘清海,史本山.研发外包契约选择:基于事后效率的研究[J].软科学,2012,26(5):136-140.
作者姓名:刘清海  史本山
作者单位:1. 西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031;贵阳学院,贵阳550005
2. 西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都,610031
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学基金项目,贵阳市软科学研究项目
摘    要:分析了事前研发外包契约的选择对事后效率的影响,构建了一个基于研发外包背景的事后敲竹杠模型;从事后交易效率的视角分析了事前研发外包契约的选择,将事前契约作为事后交易的参考点。结果发现:只有研究单位得到应有的权利时才会提供全部的创新知识;事前签订固定许可费用契约易产生敲竹杠成本,而签订灵活价格契约会导致双方争论而产生折扣成本,但事后效率优于签订固定许可费用契约;如果公司作为研发出资方,拥有创新产权并分享大部分的创新收益是有效率的。

关 键 词:研发外包  契约  敲竹杠  事后效率

The Choice of Contract in R&D Outsourcing:From the Viewpoint of Ex-post Efficiency
LIU Qing-hai , SHI Ben-san.The Choice of Contract in R&D Outsourcing:From the Viewpoint of Ex-post Efficiency[J].Soft Science,2012,26(5):136-140.
Authors:LIU Qing-hai  SHI Ben-san
Institution:LIU Qing-hai1,2,SHI Ben-san1(1.School of Economics & Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031; 2.Guiyang University,Guiyang 550005)
Abstract:The paper analyzes the influence of the choice of ex-ante contract of R&D efficiency on the ex-post efficiency and builds a model of ex-post hold-up based on R&D outsourcing.It analyzes the choice of ex-ante contract of R&D efficiency from the viewpoint of ex-post efficiency.The results show that: only if research units get deserved rights will they provide all innovative knowledge;ex-ante fixed license fee will generate hold-up cost,and flexible price contract will lead to discount cost,while ex-post efficiency is superior to fixed license contract;as the investor of R&D,it is efficient to own innovative property and share most innovative profit.
Keywords:R&D outsourcing  contract  hold-up  ex-post efficiency
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