| 基于产权理论的基层管理者越轨行为原因与模型分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 葛韧琦,张明善,姚珣.基于产权理论的基层管理者越轨行为原因与模型分析[J].软科学,2011,25(8):104-107. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 葛韧琦 张明善 姚珣 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 西南民族大学管理学院,成都,610041 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 2010年度教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJA630207); 四川省哲学社会科学研究“十一五”规划2010年度课题(SC10B002) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 以哈特的产权理论为基础建立模型,分析了企业管理中基层管理人员的越轨行为发生的原因及管理漏洞。通过在不完全合同理论模型中修改利得分配比例及添加串谋因素,能够较为清晰地分析出导致该形为产生的经济原因。研究结果表明,在不健全的产权关系下,基层管理人员利用串谋行为可以弥补其因工资风险变动带来的经济损失,从而激励其越轨行为的发生。
|
| 关 键 词： | 越轨行为 产权 不完全合同 串谋 |
Analysis of Front- line Managers' Deviant Behavior Based on the Theory of Property Right |
| |
| GE Ren-qi,ZHANG Ming-shan,YAO Xun.Analysis of Front- line Managers' Deviant Behavior Based on the Theory of Property Right[J].Soft Science,2011,25(8):104-107. |
| |
| Authors: | GE Ren-qi ZHANG Ming-shan YAO Xun |
| |
| Institution: | GE Ren-qi,ZHANG Ming-shan,YAO Xun(School of Management,Southwest University for Nationalities,Chengdu 610041) |
| |
| Abstract: | A model based on Hart's property right theory is built to analyze the cause of front-line managers' deviant behaviors and the loopholes in management in this paper.It can be clearly found out the economic reasons for deviant behaviors by revising allocation proportion and adding collusion factor to Hart's incomplete contract theory.The research suggests that front-line managers can compensate the economic loss caused by the risk in salary through collusion behaviors under the condition of imperfect property... |
| |
| Keywords: | deviant behavior property right incomplete contract collusion |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
