| 基于回收努力程度的逆向供应链激励机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 王文宾,达庆利.基于回收努力程度的逆向供应链激励机制设计[J].软科学,2009,23(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 王文宾 达庆利 |
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| 作者单位： | 东南大学,经济管理学院,南京,211189 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，山东省软科学项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 应用委托代理理论研究了逆向供应链的激励机制设计问题。分别讨论了信息对称与信息不对称情形下的逆向供应链激励机制设计方法,比较了两种情形下激励机制的不同。结果表明:与信息对称情形相比,信息不对称情形下回收商不仅获得固定收入,而且在获得制造商对于回收商的风险补偿的同时承担等比例的风险;两种情形下回收商的期望效用均为其保留收入水平,而信息不对称情形下制造商的效用降低;制造商设计激励机制时要考虑代理成本的影响因素并做代理成本与监督成本的权衡。
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| 关 键 词： | 逆向供应链 回收努力程度 激励机制 风险 委托代理 |
Design of the Incentive Mechanism for the Reverse Supply Chain Based on Collection Effort Degree |
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| WANG Wen-bin,DA Qing-li.Design of the Incentive Mechanism for the Reverse Supply Chain Based on Collection Effort Degree[J].Soft Science,2009,23(2). |
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| Authors: | WANG Wen-bin DA Qing-li |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the design of incentive mechanisms applying the principal-agent theory for the reason of the difficulty about contracting the collection effort.The differences of incentive mechanism with information symmetry and asymmetry are discussed and compared respectively.The results show that the collector not only gains the fixed income but also gains the risk compensation and bears the same proportion of the risk with information asymmetry;however,the collector only gains the fixed income with information symmetry.Secondly,the collector's expected benefit is the same in both cases;in contrast,the manufacturer's expected benefit is lower with information asymmetry.Thirdly,the manufacturer should pay attention to the agent cost's influence factors and should balance the agent cost and the supervising cost. |
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| Keywords: | reverse supply chain collection effort degree incentive mechanism risk principal-agent |
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