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流域初始水权分配中强弱势群体间的演化博弈分析
引用本文:陈艳萍,吴凤平,周晔.流域初始水权分配中强弱势群体间的演化博弈分析[J].软科学,2011,25(7):11-15.
作者姓名:陈艳萍  吴凤平  周晔
作者单位:河海大学商学院,南京,210098
基金项目:国家“十一五”科技支撑计划重点项目(2007BAB28B03); 河海大学“211工程”三期重点学科子项目;河海大学校级重点学科项目
摘    要:将流域中的区域分成弱势群体和强势群体,建立弱势群体和强势群体间的演化博弈模型,分析各群体的复制动态和演化稳定策略,演化博弈系统的稳定性。研究表明,两群体间的演化博弈存在唯一的演化稳定策略:强势群体选择"放弃水权量q"策略,而弱势群体为了防止强势群体改变策略,必须总是选择"引发冲突"策略。根据演化稳定策略调整各区域的水权,可以有效化解初始水权分配中强弱势群体间的冲突,从而构造和谐有序的用水环境。提出从政策倾斜、经济补偿和生态补偿三方面保护弱势群体利益的相关建议。

关 键 词:初始水权分配  冲突  弱势群体  强势群体  演化博弈

Analysis of Evolutionary Game between Strong Group and Vulnerable Group in Initial Water Rights Allocation
CHEN Yan-ping,WU Feng-ping,ZHOU Ye.Analysis of Evolutionary Game between Strong Group and Vulnerable Group in Initial Water Rights Allocation[J].Soft Science,2011,25(7):11-15.
Authors:CHEN Yan-ping  WU Feng-ping  ZHOU Ye
Institution:CHEN Yan-ping,WU Feng-ping,ZHOU Ye(School of Business,Hohai University,Nanjing 210098)
Abstract:The regions in a river basin are divided into strong group and vulnerable group.By building evolutionary game model of the two groups,the replicate dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy(ESS) of both groups and the stability of the evolutionary game system are analyzed.The study shows: there is a unique ESS of the evolutionary game between the two groups;if strong group chooses the strategy of giving up water right amount q,vulnerable group has to choose the strategy of triggering conflicts to prevent st...
Keywords:initial water rights allocation  conflicts  vulnerable group  strong group  evolutionary game  
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