| 我国医疗服务供方准入规制有效性的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王晓玲.我国医疗服务供方准入规制有效性的博弈分析[J].软科学,2009,23(12):63-68. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王晓玲 |
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| 作者单位： | 武汉大学,社会保障研究中心,武汉,430072;深圳大学,经济学院,广东,深圳,518060 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 从经济学角度,运用博弈论的研究方法,通过建立一个以医院服务品质为内生变量的模型,对两种市场形态下定点医院的行为进行分析,得出结论:医保供方的准入规制会导致效率损失,并对制度的改进提出建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 医疗供方 准入规制 医疗品质 |
A Game Analysis on the Effectiveness of Chinese Medical Service Supplier Entrance Regulation |
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| WANG Xiao-ling.A Game Analysis on the Effectiveness of Chinese Medical Service Supplier Entrance Regulation[J].Soft Science,2009,23(12):63-68. |
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| Authors: | WANG Xiao-ling |
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| Abstract: | By theory of game,this paper constructs a model,which considers medical quality as its endogenous variable.Then it analyzes the regulation effectiveness of each fixed-point hospital in the least competitive situation and the most competitive situation.Resutls show that the entrance regulation of DHS is likely to bring quality damage.In the end,it brings some improved advice about medicare system |
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| Keywords: | medical supplier entrance regulation medical quality |
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