| 抵押条款在信贷合约中的经济意义研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 严太华,张龙,李传昭.抵押条款在信贷合约中的经济意义研究[J].中国软科学,2004(3):36-39. |
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| 作者姓名： | 严太华 张龙 李传昭 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044 |
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| 摘 要： | 在假定抵押资源不受限制以及利率可自由浮动的情况下,分贷后的信息对称和贷后的信息不对称两种情况研究了存在抵押条件时的银企最优契约。无论贷后信息是否对称,在竞争型市场结构中都可以利用抵押条件和利率设计不同的契约组合,实现低风险借款企业与高风险借款企业的分离均衡,在垄断型市场中可以利用一定的契约组合迫使高风险借款企业放弃借款。甄别机制与一般的筛选机制相比,无论贷后信息是否对称,也无论是何种市场结构,甄别机制都可以实现银企更大的总收益。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 抵押条件 竞争市场均衡 垄断市场均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-9753(2004)03-0036-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年5月5日 |
The Economic Implication of Pledge Items in Credit Contract |
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| YAN Tai-hu,ZHANG Long,LI Chuan-zhao.The Economic Implication of Pledge Items in Credit Contract[J].China Soft Science,2004(3):36-39. |
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| Authors: | YAN Tai-hu ZHANG Long LI Chuan-zhao |
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| Abstract: | Under the condition of the unlimited resource of pledge and floatable interest rate, the optimal contract between a bank and enterprise is studied from both sides of information symmetry and information asymmetry after credit. Whether information symmetry or not after credit, a separating equilibrium between high risk enterprise and low risk enterprise can be realized with different combination of pledge and interest rate in competitive market. In monopolistic market a contract combination can also be used to force high risk enterprise to leave credit market. Compared with common screening mechanism, this kind of screening mechanism can help to realize larger total return whether information symmetry or not after credit. |
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| Keywords: | information asymmetry pledge condition the competitive equilibrium the monopolistic equilibrium |
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