| 电信产业管制分析:基于管制激励理论的视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 田宇,马钦海.电信产业管制分析:基于管制激励理论的视角[J].中国软科学,2010(3). |
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| 作者姓名： | 田宇 马钦海 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 东北大学 工商管理学院,辽宁,沈阳,110004;中国联合网络通信有限公司,沈阳分公司,辽宁,沈阳,110004
2. 东北大学 工商管理学院,辽宁,沈阳,110004 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文利用管制激励理论的最新成果,建立了一个电信产业管制模型,并通过放松电信管制机构的激励相容约束条件,分析在此约束条件不能保证的情况下立法者的最优管制政策.研究结果表明:(1)立法者采取的最优管制政策由两种相反方向的力量决定:一是电信管制机构能被激励相容的概率的大小,二是电信运营商贿赂的成本的大小.(2)提高电信运营商行贿成本和管制机构的风险偏好,可以使被管制企业如实地显示出其成本信息.
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| 关 键 词： | 电信产业 管制 激励相容 管制激励 |
On the Regulation of Telecommunication Industry: From the Perspective of Regulation Incentive Theory |
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| TIAN Yu,MA Qin-hai.On the Regulation of Telecommunication Industry: From the Perspective of Regulation Incentive Theory[J].China Soft Science,2010(3). |
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| Authors: | TIAN Yu MA Qin-hai |
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| Institution: | TIAN Yu1,2,MA Qin-hai1(1.School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110004,China,2.China United Network Corporation Limited,Shenyang Branch,China) |
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| Abstract: | This article established a regulation model to analyze the optimal regulation policy,releasing the constraint condition of incentive compatibility.Then the regulation incentive on China's telecommunication industry is analyzed.The results show that:(1)the optimal regulation policy is up to two factors which are run counter to each other: the probability of incentive compatibility and the cost of telecommunication operators' bribery.(2) an independent regulation institution and a more restrict audit will hel... |
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| Keywords: | telecommunication industry regulation incentive compatibility regulation incentive |
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