| 信贷市场中的信息不对称分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王昌林,蒲勇健.信贷市场中的信息不对称分析[J].中国软科学,2004(4):75-78. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王昌林 蒲勇健 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044 |
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| 摘 要： | 由于借贷双方利益和风险上的不对称性导致借贷关系不同于一般买卖关系。文章通过构建银行对企业信贷博弈模型,说明信贷市场上的信息不对称是导致"市场失败"、资金价格严重扭曲致使资金不能有效配置的主要原因。并通过模型说明要解决信息不对称的影响,除了规范银行内部管理机制、增强企业经营管理透明度外,政府的各项政策是关键。
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| 关 键 词： | 信贷市场 信息不对称 利率 财务杠杆 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-9753(2004)04-0075-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年6月20日 |
Analysis on Asymmetric Information in Credit Markets |
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| WANG Chang-lin,PU Yong-jian.Analysis on Asymmetric Information in Credit Markets[J].China Soft Science,2004(4):75-78. |
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| Authors: | WANG Chang-lin PU Yong-jian |
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| Abstract: | The relationship between lender and debtor is different from that of buyer and seller because of the asymmetric income and risk between the two. By setting up a game model of bank-enterprise credit relationship, this paper indicates that the primary reason of "market invalidation"and distribution invalidation caused from the distortion of capital price is the asymmetric information in credit markets. We also find that governmental policies are the most critical factor to solve the problem of asymmetric information in credit markets, besides the factors of standardization of the bank interior management and improvement of the enterprise management transparency. |
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| Keywords: | credit markets asymmetric information interest rates financing leverage |
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