| 透视国有资本多层代理关系：特征、症状与对策 |
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| 引用本文： | 杜征征,陈代欣.透视国有资本多层代理关系：特征、症状与对策[J].深圳职业技术学院学报,2008,7(2):55-58. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杜征征 陈代欣 |
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| 作者单位： | 中央财经大学,金融学院,北京,100081 |
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| 摘 要： | 伴随我国市场经济改革的逐步深入，国有企业、国有资本的经营管理方式更为灵活，极大地解放了生产力，提高了生产和资源配置效率，促进了经济的发展和社会福利水平的提高。但在国有资本运营的改革中，由于其独特的委托．代理关系，不但降低了国有资本的效率发挥，甚至加剧了国有资本的流失。本文希望在深入分析我国国有资本委托．代理关系的独特性及其影响的基础上，提出一些防止其弊端的切实措施。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托-代理关系 国有资本 产权 所有者缺位 |
Multi-layered Commission-Agency Relations: Features,Problems and Countermeasures |
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| DU Zheng-zheng,CHEN Dai-xin.Multi-layered Commission-Agency Relations: Features,Problems and Countermeasures[J].Journal of Shenzhen Polytechnic,2008,7(2):55-58. |
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| Authors: | DU Zheng-zheng CHEN Dai-xin |
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| Institution: | ( Central University of Finance and Economics, School of Finance, Beijing, 100081, China) |
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| Abstract: | With the gradual deepening of reform of China＇s market economy, the increasingly flexible management of state-owned enterprises and state-owned capital has been developing the productive forces, improving the efficiency of production and allocation of resources, promoting economic development and enhancing the level of social welfare. But the unique commission-agency relations in the reform of state-owned capital operation have been not only reducing the efficiency of state-owned capital, but also exacerbating the loss of state-owned capital. In this paper, after in-depth analysis of the uniqueness and their flaws of commission-agency relations of China＇s state-owned capital, we offer some practical measures to overcome its shortcomings. |
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| Keywords: | commission-agency relations state-owned capital property rights owners＇ absence |
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