| 上市公司利润操纵与会计监管的不完全信息博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 衣长军.上市公司利润操纵与会计监管的不完全信息博弈分析[J].华侨大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004(3):30-35. |
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| 作者姓名： | 衣长军 |
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| 作者单位： | 华侨大学,经济管理学院,福建,泉州,362021 |
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| 基金项目： | 福建省社科规划课题(2003B062) |
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| 摘 要： | 运用不完全信息博弈理论，以经济学角度对上市公司利润操纵与会计监管问题进行研究。从理论上揭示上市公司、注册会计师与证监会的行为动机和博弈均衡结果，并利用以上结论，提出对我国上市公司会计监管的几点启示与建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 上市公司 利润操纵 会计监管 不完全信息博弈分析 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-1398(2004)03-0030-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年2月26日 |
Analysing Profit Manipulation and Accounting Supervision of Listed Companies by Game Theory of Incomplete Information |
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| YI Chang-jun.Analysing Profit Manipulation and Accounting Supervision of Listed Companies by Game Theory of Incomplete Information[J].Journal of Huaqiao University(Humanities & Social Science),2004(3):30-35. |
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| Authors: | YI Chang-jun |
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| Abstract: | By using game theory of incomplete information,the author deals with profit manipulation of listed companies and supervision through accounting from the perspective of economics.The behavioral motive of listed companies and registered accountant and securities supervision commission as well as the result of game balance are revealed theoretically.Taking advantage of the conclusion mentioned above,some inspiration and suggestions on accounting supervision of listed companies in our country are put forward here. |
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| Keywords: | listed companies profit manipulation accounting supervision analysing game of incomplete information |
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