| 经济学中团队激励理论述评 |
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| 引用本文： | 易定红,彭鹏.经济学中团队激励理论述评[J].教学与研究,2006,55(11):80-86. |
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| 作者姓名： | 易定红 彭鹏 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国人民大学,劳动人事学院,北京,100872 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文系统概括了20世纪80年代以来团队激励理论的发展方向和主要内容,根据理论基础的差异以及团队存在周期的不同,本文将这一领域划分成两大分支———单期条件下的团队最优激励机制设计理论和多期重复博弈框架中的团队激励理论,然后展开介绍相关文献。最后,文章总结了团队激励理论的主要贡献,指出了其中存在的若干问题,探讨了这一领域未来的发展趋势。
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| 关 键 词： | 团队激励 最优机制设计 重复博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 0257-2826(2006)11-0080-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年6月20日 |
A Review of Researches on Team Incentives in Economics |
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| YI Ding-hong,PENG Peng.A Review of Researches on Team Incentives in Economics[J].Teaching and Research,2006,55(11):80-86. |
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| Authors: | YI Ding-hong PENG Peng |
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| Abstract: | The paper presents a systematic review of the development trends and major ideas of the team incentive theory since the 1980s.The authors divide the existing literature into two categories according to the varying theories and duration of the teams,and then discuss the two branches respectively.One branch deals with optimal incentive mechanism design in the short run,and the other covers the repetition of the agency game in the long run.At the end of the paper,major contributions of the team incentive theories are summarized,their limitations are pointed out,and future research in this area is discussed. |
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| Keywords: | team incentives optimal mechanism repeated games[ |
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