| 农村义务教育财政供给的委托代理关系研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈静漪,袁桂林.农村义务教育财政供给的委托代理关系研究[J].教育发展研究,2008(19). |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈静漪 袁桂林 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北师范大学教科院;北京师大教育学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 全国教育科学研究规划课题 |
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| 摘 要： | 在农村义务教育财政供给方面,政府间的委托代理产生了两大问题,即下级政府义务教育财政供给信息不完全导致的反向选择、下级政府义务教育投入行为不能被监控导致的道德风险.问题产生的原因,一是政府间农村义务教育财政投入收益的不一致,二是农村义务教育财政供给契约缔结过程中的代理人缺位.要解决这两大问题.必须构建相应机制,具体包括建立义务教育财政信息披露机制、农村义务教育财政供给状况考核机制、农村义务教育财政转移支付制度和农村义务教育财政供给决策参与机制等.
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| 关 键 词： | 农村义务教育 教育财政供给 委托代理 |
The Research on Agency Problems of Rural Compulsory Education Funding Supply |
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| Chen Jinyi & Yuan Guilin.The Research on Agency Problems of Rural Compulsory Education Funding Supply[J].Exploring Education Development,2008(19). |
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| Authors: | Chen Jinyi & Yuan Guilin |
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| Institution: | Chen Jinyi & Yuan Guilin (Northeast Normal University,Changchun 130024) |
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| Abstract: | About rural compulsory education funding supply, principle-agency relationship between governments causes two main problems:one problem is inverse selection stemmed from incomplete information about inferior governments' education demand and fiscal revenue, and the other one is moral hazard resulted from imperfect monitor of inferior governments' behavior. The deep reasons lie in the inconsistent interests between governments and the absence of agents in signing compulsory education funding contract. To sol... |
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| Keywords: | rural compulsory education education funding supply principle-agency |
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