| 数字内容产品版权保护的演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 赵艳,王文举,倪渊.数字内容产品版权保护的演化博弈分析[J].图书情报工作,2019,63(2):43-51. |
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| 作者姓名： | 赵艳 王文举 倪渊 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 首都经济贸易大学经济学院 北京 100070;
2. 北京物资学院经济学院 北京 101149;
3. 北京信息科技大学经济管理学院 北京 100192;
4. 绿色发展大数据决策北京市重点实验室 北京 100192 |
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| 基金项目： | 本文系国家重点研发计划项目"服务价值与文化传播评估理论与技术"（项目编号：2017YFB1400400）和勤信英才项目（项目编号：QXTCPC201706）研究成果之一。 |
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| 摘 要： | 目的/意义]基于版权保护的演化博弈分析，有助于探究数字内容产品的原创主体对仿冒行为是否具有容忍度，以及不同仿冒水平下实施版权保护的策略选择，对规范数字内容产品市场主体行为具有一定指导意义。方法/过程]首先借助演化博弈模型，分析原创主体与仿冒主体的利益演化过程，探究版权保护下原创主体对仿冒水平的容忍行为；然后通过细化博弈双方的利润函数模型，探究原创主体容忍度水平的决定因素。结果/结论]原创主体对较小的仿冒水平存在一定的容忍度，对较高的仿冒水平零容忍。最大仿冒水平容忍度由仿冒交叉收益系数、收益模型常系数、产品研发成本系数和原创主体的产品研发努力水平倍数4个因素共同决定。
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| 关 键 词： | 数字内容产品 版权保护 仿冒水平容忍度 演化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-07-15 |
| 修稿时间： | 2018-09-08 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Copyright Protection of Digital Content Products |
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| Zhao Yan,Wang Wenju,Ni Yuan.Evolutionary Game Analysis of Copyright Protection of Digital Content Products[J].Library and Information Service,2019,63(2):43-51. |
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| Authors: | Zhao Yan Wang Wenju Ni Yuan |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Economics, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070;
2. School of Economics, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149;
3. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Information Science & Technology University, Beijing 100192;
4. Laboratory of Bid Data Decision making for Green Development, Beijing 100192 |
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| Abstract: | Purpose/significance] Based on the evolutionary game analysis of copyright protection, it is helpful to explore whether the original subject of digital content products has tolerance to counterfeiting behavior, and to explore the strategic choice of implementing copyright protection under different counterfeit levels. It has certain guiding significance for regulating the behavior of market participants in digital content products.Method/process] Firstly, the evolutionary game model was used to analyze the interest evolution process of original subject and counterfeit subject, and to explore the tolerance of original subject to counterfeiting under copyright protection. Then, by refining the profit function model of both sides of the game, the determinants of the tolerance level of the original subject were explored.Result/conclusion] The original subject has a certain degree tolerance for the lower level of counterfeiting and zero tolerance for the higher level of counterfeiting. The maximum counterfeit level tolerance is determined by four factors:the counterfeit cross profit coefficient, the income model constant coefficient, the product R&D cost coefficient and the product R&D effort multiples. |
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| Keywords: | digital content products copyright protection counterfeit level tolerance evolutionary game |
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