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1.
Abstract

We developed and tested a behavioral version of the Defining Issues Test-1 revised (DIT-1r), which is a measure of the development of moral judgment. We conducted a behavioral experiment using the behavioral Defining Issues Test (bDIT) to examine the relationship between participants’ moral developmental status, moral competence, and reaction time when making moral judgments. We found that when the judgments were made based on the preferred moral schema, the reaction time for moral judgments was significantly moderated by the moral developmental status. In addition, as a participant becomes more confident with moral judgment, the participant differentiates the preferred versus other schemas better particularly when the participant’s abilities for moral judgment are more developed.  相似文献   

2.
Abstract:

Cognitive developmental research has neglected the very early stages of moral development. Three recent attempts to fill this gap are briefly described. The first is Martin Hoffman's stage theory account of the origins of empathy. The second is Selman's theory of the development of social perspective‐taking. The third is Damon's account of the development of ‘positive justice’ in early childhood. The implications of these approaches for early moral education are then discussed.  相似文献   

3.
Abstract

Previous research has shown that children and adolescents can progress in the stages of moral judgment. However, in the case of adults, Kohlberg (1973) suggested there might be crystallization after the age of 25.

The purpose of this study was to establish whether the structure of moral judgment of adults could be systematically encouraged toward change. Thirty‐six adults (three groups) enrolled in an adult sexology course were assessed to determine stage level at the beginning of the course, and post‐tested at the completion of the course. Four dilemmas were used: two for general moral judgment, and two for sexual moral judgment. During the 45‐hour course, subjects were systematically introduced to arguments of a higher stage, and discussions focused on the axiological aspects of the adults’ sexual life.

Results show that there was a significant increase in the scores at the post‐test, both in general and in sexual moral judgments; subjects over 25 also increased their scores, thus indicating that the structure of moral judgment is not crystallized after that age. The existence of a differential between general and sexual moral judgments was also corroborated.

Implications with regard to the use of the ‘+1 stage’ technique for adult education, and more particularly for adult sexual education, are discussed.

  相似文献   

4.
Abstract

Kohlberg's cognitive‐developmental theory provides teachers with a framework for understanding the change and development of moral judgment and decision‐making of their pupils. One major abuse, however, may be when teachers take the stage labels associated with the hypothesized stage levels of moral judgment as indicative of static student qualities or characteristics, by placing more emphasis on perceived and labelled qualities than on the actual moral reasoning of the student. This, it is suggested, together with some empirical examples, may obscure the developmental trend of the student's moral judgment or even affect the teacher's expectations and consequently student's performance, and fails to take into account such factors as environment and interpersonal interaction. A study is reported in which curriculum consultants exposed to moral development theory were tested to determine whether they would use Kohlbergian labels of stage content or actual moral reasoning when required to make assessments. Suggestions are put forward as to how moral development theory can be more closely linked to pedagogy.  相似文献   

5.
Abstract

Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral reasoning postulates a supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending, labelled Stage Six. Kohlberg identifies this with a principle of justice, though without adequately justifying the elimination of other autonomous universal principles. The claim that this principle provides consistent, reversible and universalizable moral judgements is criticized: by itself a purely formal principle of justice can provide no particular moral judgements at all; for that we need independent values, such as the value of life which Kohlberg appeals to, but does not justify, in his discussions of the Heinz dilemma. More generally there is no reason to expect that any form of moral reasoning will be supremely adequate in Kohlberg's sense, providing a solution to all moral problems and dilemmas. The principle of justice is merely one among the many specifically moral principles which Kohlberg locats at Stage Five, albeit the one which he personally happens to favour.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Lawrence Kohlberg's many accounts of his cognitive‐developmental theory of moral reasoning is the crucial importance which he attaches to the form of reasoning labelled Stage Six, when it is a stage of development that only a tiny minority of individuals actually attain. Indeed it appears that even that number has had to be revised downward in the light of changes to the theory and scoring system, until it begins to seem that only a handful of saints and heroes, such as Socrates or Martin Luther King, remain. In fact so slender is the empirical evidence for a separate form of Stage Six reasoning that the official scoring manual (Kohlberg et al., 1977) prefers to ignore it altogether. Clearly, then, the case for Stage Six must be almost wholly theoretical, not to say philosophical, as the supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending. And by the same token it may seem that criticisms of Kohlberg's claims for Stage Six will leave the rest of the theory untouched. But that, I think, is to underestimate the significance of Stage Six. It is the apogee of his system, providing both a focus and a rationale for the stage‐development that allegedly leads to it; it is as crucial to the theory as Kohlberg's own writings make it. Without Stage Six the cognitive‐developmental account stands in need of radical re‐thinking, to put it no higher.  相似文献   

6.
Abstract

According to the cognitive‐developmental theory, intellectual development is best understood in terms of age‐related changes. This has been found to be a valid theory in the case of mentally subnormal subjects as well, although their development proceeds at a speed and up to a level different from their normal age‐mates. The same theory has been applied to moral development and describes it, likewise, as a stage‐like progress of moral reasoning with age. The present study tries to answer the following question: Does the moral reasoning of the subjects classified as subnormal change with age so that it can be said to develop? According to the results obtained (dealing with subjects nine‐, 11‐, 13‐, 15‐ and 17‐years‐old), the cognitive‐developmental hypothesis of moral development is only partially confirmed. Namely, there is a development from the less to the more mature forms of moral reasoning, but the course of that development is not entirely such as the theory assumes. Moreover, moral reasoning of the subjects in this study is more advanced than their intelligence level as expressed by the IQ score.  相似文献   

7.

One of the main deficiencies of the Kohlberg theory is that it has never lived up to the claim of being a structural developmental theory. First of all, it has never been shown, what specific problems arise at each stage and how these are resolved at the following one (integrating all lower stages). The present approach tries to fill this gap by starting from an elaborated developmental logic, which is then applied to the field of moral thinking. Thus, stages are (re)constructed successively out of one another. This procedure, however, yields a new taxonomy of moral stages, the "architecture" of which is expounded in some detail in the present paper. This new approach has important implications for moral education, especially as it allows for fine-tuned moral-cognitive stimulation (a feature which is discussed in comparison with received ways of fostering moral development). The article ends with a discussion of what the new "stairway" means for Kohlbergian theory.  相似文献   

8.
ABSTRACT

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) has been the dominant measure of moral development. The DIT has its roots in Kohlberg’s original stage theory of moral judgment development and asks respondents to rank a set of stage typed statements in order of importance on six stories. However, the question to what extent the DIT-data match the underlying stage model was never addressed with a statistical model. Therefore, we applied item response theory (IRT) to a large data set (55,319 cases). We found that the ordering of the stages as extracted from the raw data fitted the ordering in the underlying stage model good. Furthermore, difficulty differences of stages across the stories were found and their magnitude and location were visualized. These findings are compatible with the notion of one latent moral developmental dimension and lend support to the hundreds of studies that have used the DIT-1 and by implication support the renewed DIT-2.  相似文献   

9.
ABSTRACT

Elevation is the emotion elicited by witnessing acts of moral beauty and may be framed as the opposite of disgust. Two studies investigated the role of elevation in moral judgment and its relation to disgust. In Study 1 it was investigated whether elevation can attenuate the effects of disgust on moral transgression judgments. Participants were either induced to experience disgust (by giving them a bitter beverage), or to experience disgust and elevation simultaneously (by video induction). No effects of either emotion on moral transgression judgments were found. In Study 2 the nature of causal connectedness between elevation and moral virtue judgments was investigated by testing whether elevation amplifies moral virtue judgments. It was found that participants judged morally good acts as being more morally good when being elevated, suggesting that there is a bidirectional causal link between elevation and judgments of moral virtue.  相似文献   

10.
The field of early childhood education (ECE) is currently unable to reach consensus on the extent to which ECE should be based on child development. One manifestation of this situation is the dilemma that early educators purportedly face between teaching the whole child and the curriculum, between developmentally appropriate practice (DAP) and standards. The source of this dilemma is attributed to a one-dimensional understanding of children’s development in which development is privileged over learning. Addressing this dilemma begins by discussing a theoretical difference between Piaget and Vygotsky: for Piaget, development drives learning; for Vygotsky, learning drives development. This seemingly dichotomous difference is reframed, however, by the insight that Piaget and Vygotsky focused on different types of development: Piaget studied universals (e.g., object permanence); Vygotsky studied nonuniversals (e.g., cultural tools often learned in schools). Their dispute stems, therefore, from this factor: development drives learning in nonuniversal developmental sequences, but learning drives development in universal sequences. Teachers who adopt a multi-dimensional developmental framework—a framework that makes visible how the relationship between learning and development may vary within universal versus nonuniversal developmental sequences—may be better prepared to (1) make informed decisions about the extent to which they should guide children’s activities and (2) avoid the DAP versus standards dilemma. The most recent iteration of DAP moved toward adopting a multi-dimensional developmental framework when it encouraged teachers to base instructional judgments on the extent to which children’s emerging capacities will likely require greater versus lesser degrees of adult guidance, structure, and support.  相似文献   

11.
Abstract

This assessment of L. Kohlberg's theory of moral development is a dialectical critique focusing on his claim that the sixth stage of moral development is morally adequate, specifically, that it is both comprehensive and fully equilibrated. The dialectical method employed follows the generalized empirical method advanced by B. Lonergan. The paper includes a brief account of this method and of the sixth stage of moral reasoning as outlined by Kohlberg. Employing the dialectical notions of intellectual conversion and moral conversion, it uncovers certain unresolved conflicts of this stage and points to the need for a further moral stage of development, which would be both more highly differentiated and more fundamentally based.  相似文献   

12.
ABSTRACT

Lo’s variation theory is a learning and teaching theory based on Marton’s phenomenographic approach and is one of the most important backbones of learning studies. The proponents of variation theory demarcate their approach from constructivist learning approaches, stressing constructivism as philosophical framework, but not as learning theory. At the same time, the phenomenographic approach emphasizes the importance of Piaget’s work about the cognitive development, which should be considered when talking about learning and teaching. We argue that – from a theoretical point of view – Piaget’s theory of how cognitive schemata are developed and how variation theory proposes that learning can be fostered entails many similarities which are not apparent at first glance. We demonstrate the similarities and differences using a teaching example from an English as second language classroom and show the implications for practical instructional work. Finally, we discuss concrete suggestions how variation theory could benefit even more from Piaget’s theory.  相似文献   

13.
Abstract:

Kohlberg's system of moral judgment development has some important links with Piaget's work on moral judgment, though Piaget's work is not the only influence on Kohlberg's ideas. Piaget's system of moral growth is briefly examined, and the extent to which subsequent research has validated it, is noted, thus placing Kohlberg in a historical context. The ways in which Kohlberg extends or departs from Piaget's system of moral growth are examined. The concept of stages and the nature and processes of stage development are discussed, and in this context the relationship between Kohlberg's moral development and Piaget's cognitive development is examined. It is concluded on the basis both of logic and evidence that the relationship, although complex rather than isomorphic, is likely to hold considerable potential for future research.  相似文献   

14.
ABSTRACT

This article proposes that Catherine Elgin and Nelson Goodman’s work on exemplification is relevant for discussions within moral philosophy and moral education. Generalizing Elgin and Goodman’s account of exemplification to also cover ethics, the article develops a two-factor account of moral exemplarity. According to this account, instantiation and expressivity are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for someone or something to function as a moral exemplar. Applying this two-factor account of exemplarity to discussions within the philosophy of moral education the article then argues that it is the expressive aspect of moral exemplars, which explains and justifies the educational significance of such exemplars. The article concludes by discussing the similarities and differences between the expressivity account and the transparency criterion formulated by Michel Croce and Maria Silvia Vaccarezza in a recent paper.  相似文献   

15.
皮亚杰与科尔伯格道德发展理论比较   总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3  
皮亚杰与科尔伯格是从认知领域来研究人类的道德发展的。如果说皮亚杰开创了从认知领域对道德发展研究的先河,科尔伯格则是继皮亚杰之后采用认知发展取向研究道德发展的最杰出代表。从道德心理学、德育心理学的角度,从道德发展的实质与机制、影响道德发展的因素、道德发展的阶段三个层面比较他们的道德发展理论,即可揭示出他们理论的差异性与相似性,以及科尔伯格对皮亚杰的继承与发展的关系。而对他们的理论进行比较,不但有利于丰富和发展我国道德发展理论的研究,还可为我国道德教育实践做贡献。  相似文献   

16.
This article traces the connection between William James's writings in The Varieties of Religious Experience and Jean Piaget's work on moral development through Piagets early work on religious experience. James characterises religious experience as unlocking deep personal power that can sustain a “strenuous mood”. These ideas impacted the early work of Piaget on religious experience through the influence of Henri Bergson and The´odore Flournoy, both friends of James. The shared depth-psychology approach to religious experience of James and Piaget is important to current debates on spiritual and moral education.  相似文献   

17.
Abstract:

Hypothetical moral situations are often used by teachers and researchers in order to simulate real‐life moral problems. This article draws some logical distinctions between different types of moral conflict and the different types of question that can be asked about them. It is suggested that this approach must have serious limitations if it is assumed that there is a direct and straightforward connection between hypothetical and real‐life moral judgments, as the former necessarily lack the situational features of the latter.  相似文献   

18.
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19.
Abstract

The present study investigated the degree to which transgressors’ affective reactions influence children's moral judgments. Eighteen children at each of three different grade levels (first‐, second‐, and third‐grade) were required to make judgments of the goodness or badness of four different transgressors.The transgressors acted out of good or bad intent, produced low or high levels of damage and displayed the affective reactions of happiness, sadness or neutrality because of the outcomes they produced.

Results showed that the transgressors’ affective reactions significantly influenced the children's moral judgments. More importantly, the children excluded intention information when they evaluated transgressors who displayed reactions of happiness. But, they did not exclude intentions when they evaluated transgressors who displayed reactions of sadness or neutrality. A number of hypotheses were offered to account for the means by which reactions of happiness block children's use of intent information.  相似文献   

20.
From the editor     
It is argued that much of the ineffectiveness of schools in producing change is due to the educational psychologists’ moral relativity, identified with an “industrial psychologist”; model. Such relativity can result in defining educational aims in terms of “social adjustment,”; an approach that is said to have no empirical basis, or in terms of a “bag of virtues,”; an approach that is said to suffer from lack of agreement on what the virtues should be. A developmental‐philosophic strategy for defining aims of education is proposed as a solution. In this approach, the assumption is made that each later stage of moral development reflects a more adequate equilibration with the environment, and it therefore follows that what is at later stages is what ought to be. The universality of moral stages is documented and the stimulation of moral development in school and prison settings through a cognitive conflict procedure is illustrated.  相似文献   

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