共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 531 毫秒
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徐为民 《华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2000,32(3):21-27
"我相信p"是一个古老的知识论问题,但在维特根斯坦那里已经转换成为一个语言学问题.本文根据维特根斯坦逻辑哲学的命题理论,对"我相信p"以及与此相关的"我相信～p"和"我知道p"等语句进行了评述.文章认为,"我相信p"与维特根斯坦逻辑哲学命题原则的冲突是促成其哲学转向的理论根源之一,"我相信p"所蕴含的主观确定性为人文科学的可能性提供了条件. 相似文献
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王耀堂 《教学月刊(中学下旬版)》2003,(7):27-29
西方哲学史上有一个著名的案例:在剑桥大学,维特根斯坦是大哲学家穆尔的学生.有一天,罗素问穆尔:"谁是你最好的学生?"穆尔毫不犹豫地说:"维特根斯坦.""为什么?""因为,在我的所有学生中,只有他一个人在听我的课时老是露着迷茫的神色,老是有一大堆问题."罗素也是个大哲学家,后来维特根斯坦的名气超过了他.有人问:"罗素为什么落伍了?"维特根斯坦说:"因为他没有问题了." 相似文献
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"鞋好不好,只有脚知道."这话谁都懂.结婚是个人的事,对于别人的婚姻, 我们谁都无法说三道四,不过,从"毕婚族"成为潮流来说,却让我感到这是一种不好的现象. 相似文献
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西方哲学史上有一个著名的例子:在剑桥大学,维特根斯坦是大哲学家穆尔的学生,有一天,罗素问穆尔:"谁是你最好的学生?"穆尔毫不犹豫地说:"维特根斯坦。""为什么?""因为在我的学生中,只有他一个人在听我的课时老是露着茫然的神色,老是有一大堆的问题。"后来,维特根斯坦的名气超过了罗素。有人问:"罗素为什么会落伍?"维特根斯坦说:"因为他没有问题了。"从这个例子中我们不难看出,问题意识 相似文献
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西方哲学史上有一个著名的例子:在剑桥大学,维特根斯坦是大哲学家穆尔的学生。有一天,罗素问穆尔:"谁是你最好的学生?"穆尔毫不犹豫地说:"维特根斯坦。""为什么?""因为在我的学生中,只有他一个人在听我的课时老是露着茫然的神色,我才越讲越起劲。"后来,维特根斯坦的名气超过了罗素。有人问:"罗素为什么会落伍?"维特根斯坦说:"因为老师的课堂再也舞动不起来了。"从这个例子中我们不难看出,教师在教学时,课堂效率对于学生来说是多么重要!那 相似文献
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西方哲学史上有一个著名的故事:在剑桥大学,维特根斯坦是大哲学家穆尔的学生。有一天,大哲学家罗素问穆尔:"谁是你最好的学生?"穆尔毫不犹豫地回答:"维特根斯坦。""为什么?""因为在我的所有的学生中,只有他一 相似文献
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在西方"个本位"的文化背景下,人们往往十分关注"我是谁"(Who Am I)这个问题.
有人可能会说:"我是谁,这个问题太简单了,谁不知道自己是谁呢?" 然而.真正知道"我是谁".并不是一件简单的事情.君不见,在社会生活中,人们忘记自己是谁的事情常常发生.
…… 相似文献
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在《论确定性》中,维特根斯坦主张:"我知道"由三个要素构成,它们是相信、真和理由;"我知道"与"我相信"和"我确信"虽有联系,但却不能混同;"我知道"与怀疑和语言游戏是紧密相联的;对于常识命题,既不能加以怀疑,也不能声称知道,也不能说不知道。 相似文献
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维特根斯坦在其后期的哲学研究中提出了遵从规则悖论。对此悖论,克里普克等人分别从怀疑论等角度提出了各自的解读方案。后来维特根斯坦为了消除人们对悖论的误读,他用语言游戏说及其方法论来解释“遵从规则”。维特根斯坦的语言游戏说认为,只有在语言游戏的实践中,才能谈得上遵从规则,才能理解语言的意义,才能体验到生活的价值,悖论也只有放到实践中才能解决。 相似文献
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《哲学研究》论述的“遵行规则”悖论一直是哲学界探讨之热点,维特根斯坦本人也没有给出明确、清晰的消解方案,而是将其和“语言游戏”、“意义即使用”、“私人语言”等核心概念联系在一起。文章基于对“遵行规则”的解读,阐述悖论产生的原由、论证其消解,指出悖论反映了维特根斯坦的反“意义心理观”,突出他对语言本质的理解院语言是生活形式中的游戏活动。 相似文献
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维特根斯坦对怀疑论给出了新颖的解答,但有人认为他并没能对怀疑论给出系统的解答,他的遵守规则悖论本身即是一种类型的怀疑论。这种看法是基于对维特根斯坦的误解。不过,在维特根斯坦思想中的确存在怀疑论成分,他未能完全解答怀疑论,因为怀疑论在根本上是人类认识局限的体现。 相似文献
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《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2013,45(5):591-605
This paper argues that Wittgenstein considered himself an exile and indeed was a self‐imposed exile from his native Vienna; that this condition of exile is important for understanding Wittgenstein the man and his philosophy; and that exile as a condition has become both a central characteristic condition of late modernity (as much as alienation was for the era of industrial capitalism) and emblematic of literary modernism. The paper employs the notion of ‘exhilic thought’ as a central trope for understanding Wittgenstein and the topography or geography of his thought and suggests that philosophy might begin to recognize more fully the significance of location and place in order to come to terms internationalization, multiculturalism and globalization, and with postmodern notions of subjectivity that embrace aspects of the condition of being an exile. 相似文献
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薛吕 《科学技术哲学研究》2022,(1)
维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中关于“自我”概念的讨论,集中于5.6命题及其子命题,主要论述他所说的“哲学的我”或“形而上学主体”概念。通过考察各命题之间的逻辑关系以及当代解释者提出的各种观点,我们看到,只能在逻辑形式框架下讨论“世界”和“语言”概念,确认两者之间的逻辑链接点,才能真正理解维特根斯坦的真实思想。根据维特根斯坦在5.6命题表达的核心观点,自我处于一个界限上,自我本身就是界限,它规定了我们可以用语言去谈论和言说的范围。由于逻辑规定了可说与不可说的界限,逻辑概念与自我概念就是同一个概念,逻辑即自我。因此,维特根斯坦在书中所讨论的自我概念应当是一个逻辑自我概念。 相似文献
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David Simpson 《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2014,46(6):624-639
AbstractWittgenstein constantly invokes teaching, training and learning in his later work. It is therefore interesting to consider what role these notions play for him there. I argue that their use is central to Wittgenstein’s attempt to refute cognitivist assumptions, and to show how normative practices can be understood without the threat of circularity, grounded not in a kind of seeing, but in doing, and the natural reactions of an organism. This can generate a worry that Wittgenstein’s position is quietist and anti-critical: critique, as a challenge to the taken-for-granted grammar of our language game, is technically meaningless. I argue that Wittgenstein does not rule out critique. His own practice demonstrates that critique is possible, but takes place within a language game, and its status as critique is always subject to challenge in the agora of a discourse. 相似文献
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Norm Friesen 《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2017,49(1):68-77
As a landmark philosopher of language and of mind, Ludwig Wittgenstein is also remarkable for having crossed, with apparent ease, the ‘continental divide’ in philosophy. It is consequently not surprising that Wittgenstein’s work, particularly in the Philosophical Investigations, has been taken up by philosophers of education in English. Michael A. Peters, Christopher Winch, Paul Smeyers and Nicholas Burbules, and others have engaged extensively with the implications of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy for education. One challenge they face is Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘training.’ It appears throughout his discussions of language learning and in his periodic references to education. This is made all the more problematic by realizing that the German term Wittgenstein uses consistently is Abrichtung, which refers to animal dressage or obedience training, which is currently used in sadomasochistic practice, and which also connotes also the breaking of an animal’s will. I argue that this little-recognized fact has broad significance for many important Wittgenstinian insights into education. I conclude by considering how an unflinching recognition of the implications of Wittgenstein’s word choice might cast him as a pessimistic or tragic philosopher of education and upbringing—following German-language traditions—rather than as thinker more compatible with progressive Anglo-American perspectives. 相似文献
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《Educational Philosophy and Theory》2013,45(10):1065-1087
On the point that, in practices of critical thinking, we respond spontaneously in concrete situations, this paper presents an account on behalf of Wittgenstein. I argue that the ‘seeing‐things‐aright’ model of Luntley's Wittgenstein is not adequate, since it pays insufficient attention to radically new circumstances, in which the content of norms is updated. While endorsing Bailin's emphasis on criteria of critical thinking, Wittgenstein would agree with Papastephanou and Angeli's demand to look behind criteriology. He maintains the primacy of the practical, and yet contends that a reasonable person lets rules of rationality compel her. These rules are not mere heuristics. I further examine Burbules' conception of communicative reason, and, among others, his interpretation of Wittgenstein's sign‐post example. 相似文献
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道义悖论研究 总被引：5，自引：0，他引：5
陈锐 《信阳师范学院学报(哲学社会科学版)》2004,24(3):12-17
道义逻辑是逻辑学发展的新分支,道义悖论也因此成为一个全新的研究领域。四种重要的道义悖论并不是严格意义上的逻辑悖论。其中影响最大的悖论是齐硕姆悖论,它主要涉及到如何可靠地表达条件义务的问题,因此,要想可靠地表达条件义务,必须建立二元道义系统。 相似文献
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Steinar Bøyum 《Journal of Philosophy of Education》2013,47(3):491-506
Wittgenstein often refers to matters of learning, and there have been efforts to extract a social conception of learning from his writings. In the first half of this article, I look at three such efforts, those of Meredith Williams, Christopher Winch, and David Bakhurst, and I say why I think these efforts fail. As I go on to argue, though, there is a fairly trivial sense in which learning is a social rather than a psychological phenomenon: ordinarily, there are public criteria for whether someone has learned something. Yet, in the second half of the article, I point to an exception to this general rule. Taking a cue from Wittgenstein, I call this ‘intransitive learning’, as it refers to learning experiences where we cannot say what we have learned or where there simply isn't anything in particular that we have learned. This is a use that is not easily accommodated by received definitions of learning. It also represents a genuinely psychological use of the word ‘learn’. In contrast to ordinary cases of learning, claims about intransitive learning function like expressions and are marked by first‐person authority. 相似文献