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1.
Social Influences on False Belief Access: Specific Sibling Influences or General Apprenticeship? 总被引：5，自引：1，他引：5
Charlie Lewis Norman H. Freeman Chrystalla Kyriakidou Katerina Maridaki-Kassotaki Damon M. Berridge 《Child development》1996,67(6):2930-2947
Some recent studies have found a relation between the number of siblings 3–4-year-old children have and their performance on false belief tasks. 2 experiments reported here examine a variety of factors in children's social environments, including daily contact with peers and adults as well as the numbers of their siblings, on a battery of false belief tests. In Experiment 1, 82 preschoolers were studied in Rethymnon, Crete, in order to obtain a range of extended kin available as a resource for the child. In Experiment 2, 75 Cypriot preschoolers were studied in Nicosia in order to examine the influences of each child's daily social contacts, as measured by maternal questionnaire. Logistic regression revealed that the factors which account for most of the predicted variance on the theory of mind tests were ( a ) the number of adult kin available (Experiment 1) or adults interacted with daily (Experiment 2), ( b ) the child's age, ( c ) the number of older siblings a child has, and ( d ) the number of older children interacted with daily. The results suggested that theory of mind is not simply passed from one sibling to another in a process of social influence. It seems more likely that a variety of knowledgeable members of her or his culture influence the apprentice theoretician of mind. 相似文献
2.
Carles Rostan Francesc Sidera Jèssica Serrano Anna Amadó Eduard Vallès-Majoral Moisès Esteban 《Infancia y Aprendizaje》2013,36(3):498-529
AbstractThis study examines the temporal effect of different trainings designed to favour the development of false belief understanding. A sample of 78 pre-school children aged between three years, five months and three years, 11 months was divided into three training conditions. After three training sessions, they were immediately evaluated in post-test 1 and again a month and a half later in post-test 2. The results showed that the efficiency of the training conditions depended both on the type of linguistic communication and on the use of deceptive objects. Also, the effect of the training was maintained for at least a month and a half after post-test 1 and it was transferred from the trained task to other false belief tasks. The results are commented according to the possibility of using language-based trainings to foster children’s theory of mind understanding in educational contexts. 相似文献
3.
Serena Lecce Federica Bianco Patrizia Demicheli Elena Cavallini 《Child development》2014,85(6):2404-2418
This study investigated the relation between theory of mind (ToM) and metamemory knowledge using a training methodology. Sixty‐two 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children were recruited and randomly assigned to one of two training conditions: A first‐order false belief (ToM) and a control condition. Intervention and control groups were equivalent at pretest for age, parents' education, verbal ability, inhibition, and ToM. Results showed that after the intervention children in the ToM group improved in their first‐order false belief understanding significantly more than children in the control condition. Crucially, the positive effect of the ToM intervention was stable over 2 months and generalized to more complex ToM tasks and metamemory. 相似文献
4.
Fledgling Theories of Mind: Deception as a Marker of Three-Year-Olds' Understanding of False Belief 总被引：3，自引：1，他引：3
3 studies involving more than 70 3- and 4-year-olds were carried out in an effort to better secure an earlier but controversial set of findings interpreted as demonstrating that children younger than 4 already have a grasp of the possibility of false belief, and consequently deserve to be credited with some authentic if fledgling theory of mind. These studies, which relied on a measure of deceptive hiding rather than more familiar "unexpected change" procedures for indexing false belief understanding, all demonstrated that even the youngest of these subjects: (a) accurately anticipated the likely impact of their deceptive strategies on both the behaviors (Study 1) and beliefs (Study 3) of their opponents, and (b) were able to selectively employ these same methods of information management as a means of helping as well as hindering the efforts of others (Study 2). 相似文献
5.
Given that gestures may provide access to transitions in cognitive development, preschoolers' performance on standard tasks was compared with their performance on a new gesture false belief task. Experiment 1 confirmed that children (N=45, M age=54 months) responded consistently on two gesture tasks and that there is dramatic improvement on both the gesture false belief task and a standard task from ages 3 to 5. In 2 subsequent experiments focusing on children in transition with respect to understanding false beliefs (Ns=34 and 70, M age=48 months), there was a significant advantage of gesture over standard and novel verbal-response tasks. Iconic gesture may facilitate reasoning about opaque mental states in children who are rapidly developing concepts of mind. 相似文献
6.
Courtin C 《Journal of deaf studies and deaf education》2000,5(3):266-276
The ability to attribute false beliefs (i.e., demonstrate theory of mind) by 155 deaf children between 5 and 8 years of age was compared to that of 39 hearing children ages 4 to 6. The hypotheses under investigation were (1) that linguistic features of sign language could promote the development of theories of mind and (2) that early exposure to language would allow an easier access to these theories. Deaf children were grouped according to their communication mode and the hearing status of their parents. The results obtained in three false belief tasks supported the hypotheses: effective representational abilities were demonstrated by deaf children of deaf parents, whereas those born to hearing parents appeared delayed in that regard, with differences according to their communication mode. 相似文献
7.
聋儿心理理论的发展及其培养 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
心理理论的研究是心理学中近年来研究的热点问题,心理理论是社会认知的重要组成部分。我国聋儿占残疾人总数的比例很大,探讨聋儿的心理发展与教育对于构建和谐社会具有十分重要的现实意义。目前对聋儿心理理论的研究主要集中在聋儿对错误信念的理解和其他心理状态的发展等方面。研究结果一致认为聋儿心理理论的发展落后于正常儿童,主要原因是语言交流障碍、早期家庭环境不良、学校教育不够重视等。对聋儿心理理论的培养应从注重早期诊断和语言训练、促进家庭中有效的语言交流、充分利用学校教育、扩大聋儿人际交往等方面入手。 相似文献
8.
Stephanie M. Curenton 《Early education and development》2004,15(2):124-146
This study investigated the relationship between narrative skills and theory of mind for low-income children. Two groups of low-income preschoolers, one African American (n = 33) and one European American (n = 36), created a narrative and participated in a false belief task. The European Americans outperformed African Americans on the false belief task, but there were no differences in the narrative skills across the groups. After controlling for children's age, false belief performance had no effect on European Americans' narrative abilities. However, African Americans who passed the false belief task told stories that were more grammatically coherent and social cognitively sophisticated than those African American children who did not pass the task. 相似文献
9.
采用统一背景的图片故事法,探讨7-12岁学障儿童（27人）和正常儿童（27人）在一级错误信念、二级错误信念、解释性心理理论和失言理解四个心理理论成分的发展趋势。结果表明,学障儿童的心理理论能力发展显著落后于正常儿童,主要表现在一级错误信念、二级错误信念、解释性心理理论方面;学障儿童的心理理论发展表现出随着年龄增长的特点,而正常儿童心理理论发展的年龄差异并不显著;整合全体被试探讨学龄期儿童心理理论诸成分之间的关系,结果表明,这四种心理理论成分的发展呈现复杂化的趋势。设计背景统一、内容简明的研究任务有助于全面考察心理理论能力的发展。 相似文献
10.
《Early education and development》2013,24(2):124-146
This study investigated the relationship between narrative skills and theory of mind for low-income children. Two groups of low-income preschoolers, one African American (n = 33) and one European American (n = 36), created a narrative and participated in a false belief task. The European Americans outperformed African Americans on the false belief task, but there were no differences in the narrative skills across the groups. After controlling for children's age, false belief performance had no effect on European Americans' narrative abilities. However, African Americans who passed the false belief task told stories that were more grammatically coherent and social cognitively sophisticated than those African American children who did not pass the task. 相似文献
11.
Executive functioning and preschoolers' understanding of false beliefs, false photographs, and false signs 总被引：1，自引：1，他引：0
Two studies were conducted to investigate the specificity of the relationship between preschoolers' emerging executive functioning skills and false belief understanding. Study 1 ( N =44) showed that 3- to 5-year-olds' performance on an executive functioning task that required selective suppression of actions predicted performance on false belief tasks, but not on false photograph tasks. Study 2 ( N =54) replicated the finding from Study 1 and showed that performance on the executive functioning task also predicted 3- to 5-year-olds' performance on false sign tasks. These findings show that executive functioning is required to reason only about representations that are intended to reflect a true state of affairs. Results are discussed with respect to theories of preschoolers' theory-of-mind development. 相似文献
12.
13.
Seriation, conservation, and theory of mind abilities were examined in individuals with autism ( N = 16), mental retardation ( N = 16), and in normally developing children ( N = 16). Seriation tasks included seriation of tubes, blocks, and flat squares. Conservation tasks included conservation of area, number, substance, quantity, and weight. Theory of mind tasks involved predicting false belief and understanding value and fact beliefs. Participants with autism performed better than participants with mental retardation on seriation, while no differences emerged between these groups on conservation and false belief. Individuals with autism performed less well than individuals with mental retardation on the value and fact belief tasks; however, when verbal ability was held as a covariant, the difference was no longer significant. Normally developing children performed better than the other two groups on all tasks. These results suggest that autism does not involve a specific impairment in theory of mind and that theory of mind deficits are not unique to autism. 相似文献
14.
研究用2个心理理论范式测量错误信念认知和情绪理解能力,比较33名孤儿和33名非孤儿的表现,并分析了错误信念认知和情绪理解的关系。结果显示:(1)孤儿错误信念认知水平发展趋势与非孤儿一致,但孤儿的错误信念认知能力发展显著低于非孤儿;(2)孤儿的情绪理解发展趋势和水平与非孤儿基本一致;(3)儿童(包括孤儿)错误信念认知和情绪理解在3-5岁期间发生明显变化,大多数儿童在5岁时已基本具备错误信念认知和情绪理解的能力,4岁是儿童错误信念认知和情绪理解能力发展的重要年龄;(4)儿童错误信念认知与情绪理解关系密切。 相似文献
15.
《Early education and development》2013,24(4):613-628
Research Findings. The present study examined relations between social-cognitive skills, aggression, and social competence using teacher questionnaires and tabletop tasks with preschool and kindergarten children. It was hypothesized that the acquisition of a theory of "mind," as indexed by an understanding of false beliefs, might be related to social behavior for this age group. Overall, results indicated that both generation of forceful solutions in a traditional social-problem solving task and performance on the false belief tasks were significantly related to social competence, after controlling for the effects of age, language comprehension, and teacher ratings of aggression. In addition, theory of mind understanding was a better predictor of social competence than performance on a more traditional social information-processing task that involved the generation of alternative solutions to interpersonal problems. Practice. The implications of these findings for preschool and kindergarten peer relations and their potential relevance to treatment of deficits in social skills are discussed. Specifically, training in an understanding of counterfactual thinking (e.g., through increased and structured opportunities to engage in pretend play and storytelling) may enhance preschooler social skills. 相似文献
16.
How do children reason about academic performance across development? A classic view suggests children’s intuitive theories in this domain undergo qualitative changes. According to this view, older children and adults consider both effort and skill as sources of performance (i.e., a “performance = effort + skill” theory), but younger children can only consider effort (i.e., a “performance = effort” theory). Results from two studies (N = 240 children aged 4–9) contradict the claim of theory change, suggesting instead that children as young as 4 operate with an intuitive theory of academic performance that incorporates both effort and skill as explanatory concepts. This work reveals that children’s understanding of academic performance is more continuous across development than previously assumed. 相似文献
17.
Deaf children's use of beliefs and desires in negotiation 总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3
Although several studies have shown that deaf children demonstrated impaired performances on false-belief tasks, the children's belief understanding appeared intact when asked to explain emotions or behavior. However, this finding does not necessarily indicate a full-fledged theory of mind. This study aimed to investigate deaf children's negotiation strategies in false-belief situations, because situations that require negotiation provide a natural context with a clear motivational aspect, which might appeal more strongly to deaf children's false-belief reasoning capacities. The purpose of this study was to compare the reactions of 11- to 12-year-old deaf and hearing children to scenarios in which a mother, who is unaware of a change in the situation, threatens to block the fulfillment of the child's desire. The results showed that deaf children more often failed to correct the mother's false beliefs. In contrast with hearing children, who frequently left their own desires implicit, deaf children kept stressing their desires as a primary argument, even though the mother could be expected to be fully aware of these desires. Moral claims were used to the same extent by both groups. In general, deaf children more often used arguments that did not provide new information for their conversation partners, including repetitions of the same argument. The results were interpreted in terms of the special needs that are required by the hampered communication between deaf and hearing people as well as in terms of the ongoing discussion regarding theory-of-mind development in deaf children. 相似文献
18.
On belief-desire reasoning tasks, children first pass tasks involving true belief before those involving false belief, and tasks involving positive desire before those involving negative desire. The current study examined belief-desire reasoning in participants old enough to pass all such tasks. Eighty-three 6- to 11-year-olds and 20 adult participants completed simple, computer-based tests of belief-desire reasoning, which recorded response times as well as error rates. Both measures suggested that, like young children, older children and adults find it more difficult to reason about false belief and negative desires than true beliefs and positive desires. It is argued that this developmental continuity is most consistent with either executive competence or executive performance accounts of the development of belief-desire reasoning. 相似文献
19.
William V. Fabricius Christopher R. Gonzales Annelise Pesch Amy A. Weimer John Pugliese Kathleen Carroll Rebecca R. Bolnick Anne S. Kupfer Nancy Eisenberg Tracy L. Spinrad 《Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development》2021,86(3):7-154
An important part of children's social and cognitive development is their understanding that people are psychological beings with internal, mental states including desire, intention, perception, and belief. A full understanding of people as psychological beings requires a representational theory of mind (ToM), which is an understanding that mental states can faithfully represent reality, or misrepresent reality. For the last 35 years, researchers have relied on false-belief tasks as the gold standard to test children's understanding that beliefs can misrepresent reality. In false-belief tasks, children are asked to reason about the behavior of agents who have false beliefs about situations. Although a large body of evidence indicates that most children pass false-belief tasks by the end of the preschool years, the evidence we present in this monograph suggests that most children do not understand false beliefs or, surprisingly, even true beliefs until middle childhood. We argue that young children pass false-belief tasks without understanding false beliefs by using perceptual access reasoning (PAR). With PAR, children understand that seeing leads to knowing in the moment, but not that knowing also arises from thinking or persists as memory and belief after the situation changes. By the same token, PAR leads children to fail true-belief tasks. PAR theory can account for performance on other traditional tests of representational ToM and related tasks, and can account for the factors that have been found to correlate with or affect both true- and false-belief performance. The theory provides a new laboratory measure which we label the belief understanding scale (BUS). This scale can distinguish between a child who is operating with PAR versus a child who is understanding beliefs. This scale provides a method needed to allow the study of the development of representational ToM. In this monograph, we report the outcome of the tests that we have conducted of predictions generated by PAR theory. The findings demonstrated signature PAR limitations in reasoning about the mind during the ages when children are hypothesized to be using PAR. In Chapter II, secondary analyses of the published true-belief literature revealed that children failed several types of true-belief tasks. Chapters III through IX describe new empirical data collected across multiple studies between 2003 and 2014 from 580 children aged 4–7 years, as well as from a small sample of 14 adults. Participants were recruited from the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area. All participants were native English-speakers. Children were recruited from university-sponsored and community preschools and daycare centers, and from hospital maternity wards. Adults were university students who participated to partially fulfill course requirements for research participation. Sociometric data were collected only in Chapter IX, and are fully reported there. In Chapter III, minor alterations in task procedures produced wide variations in children's performance in 3-option false-belief tasks. In Chapter IV, we report findings which show that the developmental lag between children's understanding ignorance and understanding false belief is longer than the lag reported in previous studies. In Chapter V, children did not distinguish between agents who have false beliefs versus agents who have no beliefs. In Chapter VI, findings showed that children found it no easier to reason about true beliefs than to reason about false beliefs. In Chapter VII, when children were asked to justify their correct answers in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. Similarly, in Chapter VIII, when children were asked to explain agents’ actions in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. In Chapter IX, children who were identified as using PAR differed from children who understood beliefs along three dimensions—in levels of social development, inhibitory control, and kindergarten adjustment. Although the findings need replication and additional studies of alternative interpretations, the collection of results reported in this monograph challenges the prevailing view that representational ToM is in place by the end of the preschool years. Furthermore, the pattern of findings is consistent with the proposal that PAR is the developmental precursor of representational ToM. The current findings also raise questions about claims that infants and toddlers demonstrate ToM-related abilities, and that representational ToM is innate. 相似文献