Chinese Rooms and Program Portability     

Sprevak  Mark D. 《The British journal for the philosophy of science》2007,58(4):755-776

I argue in this article that there is a mistake in Searle'sChinese room argument that has not received sufficient attention.The mistake stems from Searle's use of the Church–Turingthesis. Searle assumes that the Church–Turing thesis licencesthe assumption that the Chinese room can run any program. Iargue that it does not, and that this assumption is false. Anumber of possible objections are considered and rejected. Myconclusion is that it is consistent with Searle's argument tohold onto the claim that understanding consists in the runningof a program.

1 Searle's Argument

1.1 The Church–Turingthesis

2 Criticism of Searle's Argument

3 Objectionsand Replies

3.1 The virtual brain machine objection

3.2The brain-basedobjection

3.3 The syntax/physics objection

3.4 The abstractionobjection

3.5 The ‘same conclusion’objection

3.6 The ‘unnecessary baggage’ objection

3.7The Chinese gym objection

3.8 The syntax/semantics objection

3.9 Turing's definition of algorithm

3.9.1 Consequences

3.9.2 Criticism of the defence

4 Conclusion

  相似文献