| 风险投资委托代理关系中的监控与激励博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 党兴华,权小锋,杨敏利.风险投资委托代理关系中的监控与激励博弈分析[J].科研管理,2007,28(1):156-161. |
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| 作者姓名： | 党兴华 权小锋 杨敏利 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西安理工大学,陕西西安710048;
2. 鲁东大学,山东烟台264025 |
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| 基金项目： | 陕西省软科学课题(2005KR32)“公共财政支持陕西省科技产业发展的机制与途径研究” |
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| 摘 要： | 本文通过建立风险投资家与风险企业家行为策略的动态博弈模型,对风险企业家的激励机制、风险投资家监控机制及其相关关系进行了分析,得出从风险企业家角度,监控机制与激励合同具有互补性;从风险投资家角度,监控机制与激励合同具有替代性的研究结论。论文还结合参数分析,对影响最优激励强度与综合监控强度的变动因素进行了系统研究。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 信息不对称 监督 激励 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-2995（2007）01-006-0155 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-05-26 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-05-26 |
Analysis on the monitor and incentive game of the entrust- agency relationship in venture capital |
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| Dang Xing-hua,Quan Xiao-feng,Yang Min-li.Analysis on the monitor and incentive game of the entrust- agency relationship in venture capital[J].Science Research Management,2007,28(1):156-161. |
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| Authors: | Dang Xing-hua Quan Xiao-feng Yang Min-li |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Business Administration, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710048, China;
2. School of Geography and Resource Management, Ludong University, Yantai 264025, China |
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| Abstract: | A dynamic game model on the action strategies between venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist is built.Based on the model,an analysis on the incentive mechanism for the venture entrepreneur,monitor mechanism of the venture capitalist and correlation is made.It is concluded that from the aspect of the venture entrepreneur,the monitor mechanism and the incentive contract is complement;but from the aspect of the venture capitalist,the monitor mechanism and the incentive contract is alternative.Then combining with the parameter analysis,the variable factors between the best incentive strength and the generalized monitor strength is researched. |
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| Keywords: | entrust agency informational asymmetry monitor incentive game |
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