| 基于博弈视角的国际铁矿石长协价谈判机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | Zha盛中,王文平.基于博弈视角的国际铁矿石长协价谈判机制研究[J].预测,2012(1):39-43. |
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| 作者姓名： | Zha盛中 王文平 |
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| 作者单位： | 东南大学经济管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70973017);教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助项目(09YJA630020) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文从博弈的视角研究国际铁矿石长协价谈判机制,建立国际铁矿石长协价谈判模型,解析可能达成的长协矿均衡价格和供需方的收益,从理论上揭示长协价谈判机制的特点,并对理论分析结果进行了实际考察。研究表明,近年来国际铁矿石价格连年上涨并导致供需方利益严重失衡,并不应归咎于长协价谈判机制本身,主要还是受供需方各自的市场地位、成本以及市场供求等因素的影响。
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| 关 键 词： | 铁矿石 长期协议价格 博弈 |
Study on Negotiation Mechanism of Long-term Contract Price for Iron Ore in International Trade from a Game-theory Perspective |
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| ZHA Sheng-zhong,WANG Wen-ping.Study on Negotiation Mechanism of Long-term Contract Price for Iron Ore in International Trade from a Game-theory Perspective[J].Forecasting,2012(1):39-43. |
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| Authors: | ZHA Sheng-zhong WANG Wen-ping |
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| Institution: | (School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 210096,China) |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the negotiation mechanism of long-term contract price for iron ore in international trade from a game-theory perspective.By constructing game models and analyzing the possible equilibrium price and payoff,the characteristics of the mechanism are revealed theoretically,and the positive analysis is also made.It shows that the going-up price of the iron ore in international trade and unbalanced benefits for two sides in the negotiation in recent years is not attributed to the mechanism itself,but the market status and cost of the two sides and other market factors. |
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| Keywords: | iron ore long-term contract price game |
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