| 准公共物品私人供给机制的博弈分析——以中国交通基础设施投资为例 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 刘秉镰,刘维林.准公共物品私人供给机制的博弈分析——以中国交通基础设施投资为例[J].中国软科学,2007(8):145-151. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 刘秉镰 刘维林 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 北京交通大学,经济管理学院,北京,100044
2. 南开大学,交通经济研究所,天津,300071 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文根据交通基础设施投资需求与政府投资能力二者之间的三种关系,构建了政府与私人投资的三重博弈模型,通过对政府完全供给、私人自发参与供给和私人有偿参与供给三种情形下的博弈均衡分析,阐明了准公共物品领域中政府与私人投资者的博弈动机、行为以及效果,明确提出政府应占据博弈的主导地位以及优惠政策必须适时和适度,才能建立起社会收益与私人收益的共赢结构。
|
| 关 键 词： | 博弈 准公共物品 私人供给 交通运输 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-9753（2007）08-0145-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-03-06 |
A Game Model for the Private Supply Mechanism of Quasi- public Goods——An example from China transportation infrastructure |
| |
| LIU Bing-lian,LIU Wei-lin.A Game Model for the Private Supply Mechanism of Quasi- public Goods——An example from China transportation infrastructure[J].China Soft Science,2007(8):145-151. |
| |
| Authors: | LIU Bing-lian LIU Wei-lin |
| |
| Institution: | Economics and Business School Bering Jiaotong University,Bering 100044, China; Institute of Transport Economy, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China |
| |
| Abstract: | Based on the three different relationships between investment demand and the investment capacity of the gov- ernment,the paper constructed three game models between the government and the private investor.Through the analy- sis of the models,the motive,action and effect of the players in the quasi-public goods field are expounded systemical- ly.The paper argues that to develop a win-win structure for both of the benefits of social and private,the government should play a dominant role in the game,and the favorable policies should be utilized timely and measurably. |
| |
| Keywords: | Came theory quasi-Public goods private funding transportation |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《中国软科学》浏览原始摘要信息 |
| 点击此处可从《中国软科学》下载免费的PDF全文 |
