| 地方政府的竞争与其制度创新 |
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| 引用本文： | 岳书敬,曾召友.地方政府的竞争与其制度创新[J].软科学,2006,20(2):105-108. |
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| 作者姓名： | 岳书敬 曾召友 |
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| 作者单位： | 西南交通大学,经济管理学院,成都,610031 |
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| 摘 要： | 在考虑制度创新外在性的条件下,建立了地方政府竞争的完全但不完美信息的两阶段动态博弈模型,并通过与中央利益最大化情况的比较,得出以下结论:地方政府的竞争会加速地方政府的制度创新;追求本地区利益最大化的内在冲动使地方政府的制度创新难免出现偏离帕累托最优的现象,中央需对此做出规范与调整。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈 地方政府 制度创新 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-8409（2006）02-0105-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-12-30 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-12-30 |
Local Governments'Competition and The Institutional Innovation |
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| YUE Shu-jing,ZENG Zhao-you.Local Governments''''Competition and The Institutional Innovation[J].Soft Science,2006,20(2):105-108. |
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| Authors: | YUE Shu-jing ZENG Zhao-you |
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| Institution: | School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031 |
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| Abstract: | Based on the two-staged dynamic game model with imperfect and complete information,these following conclusions considering the institutional innovation's externality are drawn: the local governments' competition plays an important role in the institutional innovation;it is necessary for the central government to regulate the local governments' institution innovation because the latter aims to maximize the local benefit not the nation benefit. |
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| Keywords: | game theory local government institutional innovation |
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