| 国家科技计划管理改革前后科研立项合谋博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 侯晓辉,谢祥,黄磊.国家科技计划管理改革前后科研立项合谋博弈研究[J].科技管理研究,2018(6). |
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| 作者姓名： | 侯晓辉 谢祥 黄磊 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京交通大学科技处;北京交通大学经济管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学(71573011),中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2016YJS088) |
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| 摘 要： | 基于国家科技计划管理体制改革对科研立项管理带来的变化,分析改革前后中央财政科研计划立项流程和立项参与主体间的合谋情景,应用博弈论,分别构建改革前后政府监管部门、项目申请方和评审专家等科研立项参与主体间的合谋博弈模型,并对模型进行求解和分析。结果显示,提高监督的概率和监督成功率,降低合谋收益,无论改革前后,都有利于减少合谋的可能性。比较而言,改革后的管理体制更有利于遏制科研立项合谋的产生。项目承担单位和评审专家易形成合谋,可以通过减少合谋各方的合谋额外收益和增加合谋各方的合谋成本来制约,加强监管,特别是引入社会监管则是政府应该积极采取的措施。
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| 关 键 词： | 国家科技计划管理 改革 立项 合谋 博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017/6/12 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2017/7/6 0:00:00 |
Study of S T Projects Determination Collusion before and after the Reform of National S T Plan Management System based on Game Theory |
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| Abstract: | Based on the change of S T projects determination caused by the reform of National S T Plan management system, the process of National S T plan projects determination and the collusion scenario among project participants are analyzed, the collusion game model among governments" supervisory organizations, project applicants and evaluation experts is structured by Game Theory, and this model is subsequently solved and analyzed. Results show that no matter before and after the reform improving the probability of supervision and the success rate of supervision and reducing the collusion income are conducive to reducing the possibility of collusion. In comparison, the management system after reform helps to curb the production of S T projects determination collusion. Project applicants and evaluation experts are easy to form collusion, what can be circumscribed by reducing the extra profit of the collusion and increasing the cost of collusion between the parties. Strengthen supervision, especially the introduction of social supervision is the actively measure taken by the government. |
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| Keywords: | National S T Plan Management System S T Reform Projects Determination Collusion Game Theory |
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