| 基于关系契约的合同能源管理激励机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 张慧,郭婧娟.基于关系契约的合同能源管理激励机制研究[J].科技管理研究,2021,41(17):185-190. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张慧 郭婧娟 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京 100044 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家重点研发计划项目“公共机构合同能源管理与能效提升应用示范”（项目编号：2017YFE0105700) |
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| 摘 要： | 针对目前正式契约不能有效激励EPC合作主体共同努力的问题,借助委托代理理论,分析两种不同契约关系下双方的合作关系,探讨关系契约的激励作用.研究表明,在正式契约下节能项目的 系统收益并不能达到最优,引入关系契约之后,通过具有"自我实施"性的承诺可以使双方共同努力,从而使节能项目的 系统收益达到最优.
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| 关 键 词： | 合同能源管理 关系契约 委托代理理论 激励机制 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020/11/18 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2021/3/17 0:00:00 |
Research on Incentive Mechanism of Energy Performance Contracting Based on Relationship Contract |
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| Zhang Hui,Guo Jingjuan.Research on Incentive Mechanism of Energy Performance Contracting Based on Relationship Contract[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2021,41(17):185-190. |
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| Authors: | Zhang Hui Guo Jingjuan |
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| Abstract: | Energy Performance Contracting (EPC), as a model of building energy conservation, has significant effects in improving energy efficiency and alleviating energy pressure. However, because the Energy Performance Contracting has been introduced into our country for a short time, there are many problems in practical applications. Aiming at the problem that the current formal contract cannot effectively motivate the EPC partners to work together, with the help of principal-agent theory, we analyze the two parties'' cooperative relationship under the non-contractual relationship and explore the incentive effect of the relationship contract. Studies have shown that the system benefits of energy-saving projects cannot be optimal under formal contracts. After the introduction of the relationship contract, the two parties can work together through "self-implementation" commitments to optimize the system benefits of energy-saving projects. |
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| Keywords: | Energy Performance Contracting Relationship Contract Principal-agent Theory Incentive Mechanism |
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